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Abstract
The authors [20] defined the notion of structure entropy of a graph G to measure the information embed-
ded in G that determines and decodes the essential structure of G. Here, we propose the notion of resistance
of a graph as an accompanying notion of the structure entropy to measure the force of the graph to resist cas-
cading failure of strategic virus attacks. We show that for any connected network G, the resistance of G is
R(G) = H1(G)−H2(G), whereH1(G) andH2(G) are the one- and two-dimensional structure entropy of G,
respectively. According to this, we define the notion of security index of a graph to be the normalized resistance,
that is, θ(G) = R(G)
H1(H)
. We say that a connected graph is an (n, θ)-resistor graph, if G has n vertices and has
security index θ(G) ≥ θ. We show that trees and grid graphs are (n, θ)-resistor graphs for large constant θ,
that the graphs with bounded degree d and n vertices, are (n, 2
d
− o(1))-resistor graphs, and that for a graph G
generated by the security model [18, 19], with high probability, G is an (n, θ)-resistor graph, for a constant θ
arbitrarily close to 1, provided that n is sufficiently large. To the opposite side, we show that expander graphs
are not good resistor graphs, in the sense that, there is a global constant θ0 < 1 such that expander graphs cannot
be (n, θ)-resistor graph for any θ ≥ θ0. In particular, for the complete graph G, the resistance of G is a con-
stant O(1), and hence the security index of G is θ(G) = o(1). This shows that, for arbitrarily small constant
ǫ > 0, there is an N such that for any n ≥ N , the complete graph G of n vertices cannot be an (n, ǫ)-resistor
graph. Finally, we show that for any simple and connected graph G, if G is an (n, 1− o(1))-resistor graph, then
there is a large k such that the k-th largest eigenvalue of the Laplacian of G is o(1), giving rise to an algebraic
characterization for the graphs that are secure against intentional virus attack.
1 Introduction
Shannon’s [28] metric measures the uncertainty of a probabilistic distribution as
H(p1, · · · , pn) = −
n∑
i=1
pi log2 pi. (1)
This metric and the associated concept of noise, have provided rich sources for both information science and tech-
nology. However, as pointed out by Brooks in [5], it had been a longstanding challenge to define the information
that is embedded in a physical system, which determines and decodes the essential structure of the (observed and
noisy) physical system. Such a metric, if well defined, may provide an approach to understand the folded three-
dimensional structures of proteins. Shannon [29] himself realized that his metric of information fails to support
the analysis of communication networks to answer the question such as characterization of the optimal communi-
cation networks. The answer for this question depends on a well-defined definition of the structure entropy, that
is, the information embedded in a communication network.
∗The authors are partially supported by the Grand Project “Network Algorithms and Digital Information” of the Institute of Software,
Chinese Academy of Sciences, by an NSFC grant No. 61161130530, and by a China Basic Research Program (973) Grant No. 2014CB340302.
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The challenge of the quantification of structural information becomes more and more important in the current
information age, in which noisy big data with or without structures are assumed to support the world and our so-
cieties. Structural information may provide the principles for structuring the unstructured data and for discovering
the knowledge from noisy data by removing the noises. To this end, the authors [20] introduced the notion of
coding tree of a graph, and defined the structure entropy of a graph to be the minimum amount of information
required to determine the codeword of the vertex in a coding tree for the vertex that is accessible from random
walk with stationary distribution in the graph. The structure entropy of a graph is hence the information embedded
in the graph. The structural information of a graph defined in this way allows us to decode the essential structure
of the graph simultaneously at the same time when we measure the structure entropy of the graph.
In the present paper, we analyze communication networks based on the structural information theory [20].
Specifically, we investigate the security of networks against cascading failure of virus attacks. We introduce the
notion of resistance of a graph and resistor graphs as accompanying notions of structure entropy of graphs to
analyze the security of networks.
Network security has become a grand challenge in modern information science and computer science. An
interesting discovery in network theory in the last few years is that network topology is universal in nature, society,
and industry [3]. In fact, the current highly connected world is assumed to be supported by numerous networking
systems. Real networks are not only too important to fail, but also too complicated to understand.
Erdo¨s-Re´nyi proposed the first model [10, 11] (The ER model in short) to capture complex systems based
on the assumption that real systems are evolved randomly. The ER model explores that if a graph is generated
randomly, then the diameter of the graph is exponentially smaller than the size of the graph, referred to as the small
world phenomenon. It has been shown that most real world networks do satisfy the small world phenomenon,
giving rise to the first universal property of networks. However, can we really assume that real networks are
purely random? Baraba´si and Albert [4] proposed a graph generator by introducing preferential attachment as
an explicit mechanism, the model is thus called the preferential attachment (PA) model. Consequently, networks
generated by the PA model naturally follow a power law. It has been shown that most real networks follow a
power law. Consequently, power law has become the second universal property of networks [3].
As a matter of fact, real world networks are highly connected and naturally evolving, in which information
spread easily and quickly. This is of course one of the main advantages of networks in both theory and applications.
However, at the same time, this could be one of the main disadvantages of networks. Because, virus also quickly
spreads all over the networks. It is due to this reason that network security has become a grand new challenge in
the 21st century.
Networks may fail under attack due to different mechanisms [2, 22, 13, 14, 27, 1]. The first type is the physical
attack of removal of some vertices or edges. It has been shown that in scale-free networks of the preferential attach-
ment (PA) model [4], the overall network connectivity measured by the sizes of the giant connected components
and the diameters does not change significantly under random removal of a small fraction of vertices, but vulner-
able to removal of a small fraction of the high-degree vertices [1, 9, 24]. The second type is the cascading failure
of attacks, which naturally appeared in rumor spreading, disease spreading, voting, and advertising [34, 2, 22].
One of the main features of networks in the current highly connected world is that failure of a few vertices of a
network may generate a cascading failure of the whole network. It has been shown that in scale-free networks
of the preferential attachment model even a weakly virulent virus can spread [25]. This explains a fundamental
characteristic of security of networks [27].
For the physical attacks or random errors of removal of vertices, it was shown that the optimal networks
resisting both physical attacks and random errors have at most three values of degrees for all the vertices of
the networks [33], that networks having the optimal robustness resisting both high-degree vertices attacks and
random errors, has a bimodal degree distribution [32]. To enhance the robustness of networks against biological
virus spreading, it was proposed in [8] the acquaintance immunization strategy, which calls for the immunization
of random acquaintances of randomly chosen vertices, and more recently, a security enhancing algorithm was
proposed in [26] by randomly swapping two edges for a number of pairs of edges.
Li et al [18] proposed the security model of networks by using the idea of the Art of War [31]. It has been
shown that with appropriate choices of parameters, the networks generated by the security model are secure against
attacks of small scales [19]. Li and Pan [20] proposed the notion of structure entropy of networks to quantitatively
measure the dynamical complexity of interactions and communications of the network, for each natural number
K . However, it is an important open question to define a measure of security of a graph against cascading failure
of intentional virus attacks. The authors of this paper and his coauthors [16] proposed the notions of resistance
and security index of a graph by using the one- and two-dimensional structure entropy, and verified that both the
resistance and security index measure the force of the graph to resist cascading failure of virus attacks. In [21], it
was shown that resistance maximization is in fact the principle for defending networks against the super virus that
infect all the neighbor vertices immediately. In the present paper, we establish the basic theory of resistance and
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security index of graphs.
We organise the paper as follows. In Section 2, we introduce and analyze the notions of coding tree and
structure entropy proposed by the authors in [20], we also introduce a variation of the structure entropy to study
the relationship between the Shannon entropy and the structure entropy. In Section 3, we define the notions of
resistance and security index of networks, and establish both the local and global resistance laws of networks. In
Section 4, we introduce some basic results of the resistance and security indices of networks. In Section 5, we
establish a lower bound of the resistance of bounded degree graphs. In Section 6, we show that the resistance of
a complete graph is actually a universal constant O(1). In Section 7, we establish the theory of the resistance and
security indices of the networks generated by the security model. In Section 8, we establish both the combinatorial
and algebraic characterization theorems for the graphs with the optimal two-dimensional structure entropy, i.e.,
H2(G) = O(log2 log2 n). In Section 9, we establish both the combinatorial and the algebraic characterization
theorems for the resistor graphs. In Section 10, we summarise the results of the paper.
2 Structure Entropy of Graphs
The authors of this paper [20] proposed the notion of structure entropy of a graph to measure the information
embedded in a physical system that decodes the essential structure of the system. In this section, we introduce the
notion of structure entropy.
Before introducing the structure entropy, we recall the Huffman codes [12].
2.1 Huffman codes
Suppose that Σ = {1, 2, · · · , n} such that the probability i occurs is pi, for each i. Let
n∑
i=1
pi = 1. We will
encode the elements of Σ by 0, 1-strings such that there is no codeword of an element is an initial segment of the
codeword of another element of Σ.
Suppose that T is a binary tree whose leaves are the codewords of the elements 1, 2, · · · , n. Suppose that
element i has probability pi with codeword αi in T , then the average length of the codewords is
LT (p1, p2, · · · , pn) =
n∑
i=1
pi · |αi|, (2)
where |αi| is the length of 0, 1-string αi.
The Huffman codes are to find the binary tree T such that LT (p1, p2, · · · , pn) in Equation (2) is minimized.
We define
L(p1, p2, · · · , pn) = min
T
LT (p1, p2, · · · , pn), (3)
where T ranges over all the binary trees of n leaves.
By definition, L(p1, p2, · · · , pn) is the minimum average length of the binary representation of the alphabet
Σ. Huffman codes achieve the minimum solution L(p1, p2, · · · , pn).
It is known that
L(p1, p2, · · · , pn) ≥ H(p1, p2, · · · , pn), (4)
with equality holds when pi = 2
−k for some k, and for all i, whereH(p1, p2, · · · , pn) is the Shannon entropy of
p = (p1, p2, · · · , pn).
This means that the minimum average length of the binary representation of an element picked from a prob-
ability distribution is lower bounded by the Shannon entropy of the distribution, and the Shannon entropy is the
tight lower bound of the minimum average length of the binary representations.
Before developing our theory, we recall a basic interpretation of the log2 function:
Let p be a number with 0 < p < 1. Suppose that k is a natural number such that
1
2k+1
≤ p <
1
2k
, (5)
which implies that
k + 1 ≥ − log2 p > k. (6)
Equation (6) indicates that
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(i) − log2 p is the information (or uncertainty) embedded in an item that occurs with probability p.
(ii) ⌈− log2 p⌉ many bits are sufficient to express the item that occurs with probability p.
(iii) The minimum length of the binary codeword of the item that occurs with probability p is exactly ⌈− log2 p⌉,
which is greater than or equal to the information embedded in the item occurring with probability p, that is,
− log2 p.
To define the structure entropy of a graph, we first need to encode a graph. Similarly to the Huffman codes,
we encode a graph by a tree. However, it is a priority tree below, instead of a binary tree in the Huffman codes.
2.2 Priority tree
Definition 2.1. (Priority tree) A priority tree is a rooted tree T with the following properties:
(i) The root node is the empty string, written λ.
A node in T is expressed by the string of the labels of the edges from the root to the node. We also use T to
denote the set of the strings of the nodes in T .
(ii) For every node α in T , there is a natural number k such that there are k edges linking α to its k children.
The edges are labelled by
0 < 1 < · · · < k − 1.
(Remark: (i) Unlike Huffman codes, we use an alphabet of the form Σ = {0, 1, · · · , k} for each tree node
α. In the Huffman codes, we always use the alphabetΣ = {0, 1}.
(ii) Different nodes in T may have different numbers of children, i.e., different k’s.)
(iii) Every tree node α is a string of numbers from 0 to some natural number.
For two tree nodes α, β, if α is an initial segment of β as strings, then we write α ⊆ β. If α ⊆ β and α 6= β,
we write α ⊂ β.
2.3 Coding tree of a graph
Definition 2.2. (Coding tree of a graph) Let G = (V,E) be a graph. A coding tree of G is a priority tree T such
that every tree node α ∈ T , there is a subset Tα of the vertices V , and such that the following properties hold:
(i) The root node λ is associated with the whole set V of vertices of G, that is, Tλ = V .
(ii) For every node α ∈ T , if β1, β2, · · · , βk are all the children of α, then {Tβ1, · · · , Tβk} is a partition of Tα.
(iii) For every leaf node γ ∈ T , Tγ is a singleton.
Definition 2.3. (Codeword) Let G = (V,E) be a graph, and T be a coding tree of G.
(i) For every node α ∈ T , we call α the codeword of set Tα, and Tα the marker of α.
(ii) For a leaf node γ ∈ T , if Tγ = {v}, then we say that γ is the codeword of v, and v is the marker of γ.
A coding tree T of a graphG satisfies the following
Definition 2.4. (Coding tree properties) Given a graphG and a coding tree T ofG, we assume that the following
properties hold:
(i) For every node α ∈ T , the marker Tα of α is explicitly determined. This means that if we know α, then
we have already known the marker Tα. This means that there is no uncertainty in Tα once we know the
codeword α ∈ T .
(ii) For every node α ∈ T , if we know the codeword α, then we simultaneously know β for all the codewords
β’s in the branch between the root node λ and α in T , i.e., the β with β ⊆ α.
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The advantage of the coding tree is the coding tree properties in Definition 2.4. The key to our definition of
structure entropy is to use the coding tree properties above to reduce the uncertainty of a graph by a coding tree of
the graph.
Lemma 2.1. Let G = (V,E) be a graph and T be a coding tree of G. Then:
(1) For every leaf node γ ∈ T , there is a unique vertex v such that γ is the codeword of v.
(2) For every vertex v ∈ V , there is a unique leaf node γ ∈ T such that v is the marker of γ.
Proof. By the definition of coding tree.
By Lemma 2.1, the set of all the leaves in T is the set of codewords of the vertices V . This property is the
same as the Huffman codes, that is, all the leaf nodes of the tree are the codewords desired.
2.4 Structure entropy of a graph given by a coding tree
The authors [20] introduced the notion of structure entropy of a graph.
Definition 2.5. (Structure entropy of a graph by a coding tree, Li and Pan [20]) Let G = (V,E) be a graph, and
T be a coding tree of G. We define the structure entropy of G by coding tree T as follows:
HT (G) = −
∑
α6=λ,α∈ T
gα
vol(G)
· log2
vol(α)
vol(α−)
, (7)
where gα = |E(T¯α, Tα)|, that is, the number of edges from the complement of Tα, i.e., T¯α to Tα, vol(G) is the
volume of G, that is, the total degree of vertices in G, vol(β) is the volume of the vertices set Tβ , and α
− is the
parent node of α in T .
To understand Equation (7), we conclude the following items for the metricHT (G):
(1) For every node α ∈ T , Tα is the set of vertices associated with α. Suppose that, once we known α, we have
already known the set Tα.
(2) For each nodeα ∈ T with α 6= λ, since α− is the parent node of α in T , the probability that the vertex v ∈ V
from random walk with stationary distribution in G is in Tα under the condition that v ∈ Tα− is
vol(α)
vol(α−) .
Therefore the entropy (or uncertainty) of v ∈ Tα under the condition that v ∈ Tα− is − log2
vol(α)
vol(α−) .
(3) For every node α ∈ T , gα is the number of edges that random walk with stationary distribution arrives at
Tα from vertices T¯α, the vertices outside Tα. Therefore, the probability that a random walk with stationary
distribution is from outside Tα to vertex in Tα is
gα
vol(G) .
Consider the stochastic process of random walks with stationary distribution in G. It is the stochastic process
as follows:
X0, X1, X2, · · · , (8)
with the following properties:
(i) Let x0 be the vertex chosen in V with probability proportional to vertex degree, andX0 be the codeword of
vertex x0 in T . Suppose thatXi and xi are defined.
(ii) Let xi+1 be the neighbor of xi chosen uniformly and randomly among all the neighbors of xi in G. Then
Xi+1 is defined as the codeword of xi+1 in T .
In the stochastic process in Equation (8), we are interested in the quantification of the entropy of Xi+1 under
the condition that we have already knownXi, denoted by
H˜(Xi+1|Xi). (9)
To compute H˜(Xi+1|Xi), suppose that xi and xi+1 are as above, and thatXi = α ∈ T is the codeword of xi
in T . Notice that the codeword α is a leaf node in T . By Definition 2.4, we know Tδ for all the nodes δ ⊆ α, i.e.,
the initial segments of α as strings.
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Let γ be the longest node δ ∈ T with δ ⊆ α such that xi+1 ∈ Tδ holds. Then we know that γ is an initial
segment of the codeword of xi+1 in T . To determine the codeword of xi+1 in T , we only need to find the branch
from γ to a leaf node β ∈ T such that xi+1 ∈ Tβ . According to the analysis above, the information ofXi+1 under
the condition ofXi is:
H˜(Xi+1 = β|Xi = α) = −
∑
δ∈T, γ⊂δ⊆β
gδ
vol(G))
log2
vol(δ)
vol(δ−)
,
where γ = α ∩ β is the node in T at which α and β branch in T , gδ is the number of edges in the cut (Tα, T¯δ).
We notice that, only if both xi+1 ∈ Tδ and xi 6∈ Tδ occur, we need to determine the codeword of Tδ in Tδ− ,
for which the amount of information required is − log2
vol(δ)
vol(δ−) . So, intuitively, H˜(Xi+1 = β|Xi = α) is the
amount of information, in terms of the codeword of Tδ in Tδ− , required to determine the codeword of xi+1 under
the condition that the codeword of xi is known. Note that we use the codewords of nodes in the coding tree to
measure amount of information. That is why we use the notation H˜(·) to distinguish from the classic conditional
entropy notationH(·).
Our definition ofHT (G) in Definition 2.5 is
HT (G) =
∑
e=(xi, xi+1)
xi,xi+1∈V
H˜(Xi+1 = β|Xi = α),
whereXi is the codeword of xi, andXi+1 is the codeword of xi+1.
This measures the information required to determine the codeword of the vertex in V that is accessible from
random walk with stationary distribution in G, under the condition that the codeword of the starting vertex of the
random walk is known.
2.5 Structure entropy
Definition 2.6. (Structure entropy of a graph, Li and Pan [20]) Let G = (V,E) be a graph.
(1) The structure entropy of G is defined as
H(G) = min
T
{HT (G)}, (10)
where T ranges over all the coding trees of G.
[Remark: (i) We notice that the Huffman codes require to find a binary tree T such that the LT (p1, · · · , pn)
in Equation (2) is minimized. In this case, Huffman codes have already been the optimum solution.
(ii) Our structure entropy of a graph requires to find a coding tree T such that the HT (G) in Equation
(7) is minimized. However, there is no algorithm achieving the optimal structure entropy so far. Although
there are nearly liner time greedy algorithms for approximating the optimum coding tree, with remarkable
applications. [20] ]
(2) For natural numberK , theK-dimensional structure entropy of G is defined as
HK(G) = min
T
{HT (G)}, (11)
where T ranges over all the coding trees of G of heights at mostK .
[Remark: This allows us to study the structure entropy in different dimensions.]
The metricH(G) has the following intuitions:
• The structure entropyH(G) of G is the least amount of information required to determine the codeword of
the vertex in a coding tree that is accessible from random walk with stationary distribution in G.
• The structure entropy H(G) is the information that determines and decodes the coding tree T of G that
minimizes the uncertainty in positioning the vertex that is accessible from random walk in graphG.
Therefore,H(G) is not only the measure of information, but decodes the structure of G that minimises the
uncertainty in the communications in the graph, which can be regarded as the “essential” structure of the
graph.
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TheK-dimensional structure entropyHK(G) of G has the similar intuitions as above.
We remark that the structure entropy has a rich theory with remarkable applications, more details are referred
to [20]. Here we develop the theory of security by using the structure entropy with the cut module function as
defined in [20]. It is interesting to notice that a theory of network security can be established by using only the
one- and two-dimensional structure entropy developed in [20].
2.6 A variation of structure entropy
The structure entropy of a graph in Definitions 2.5 and 2.6 is often misunderstood as the average length of the
codeword of the vertex that is accessible from random walk with stationary distribution in the graph. We argue
that this is not the case.
To better understand the question, we introduce a variation of the structure entropy. It depends on a module
function of a graph.
Definition 2.7. (Module function) Let G = (V,E) be a connected graph. Let vol(G) be the volume of G. A
module function of G is a function g of the form:
g : 2V → {0, 1, · · · , vol(G)}. (12)
We define the structure entropy of a graph with a module function as follows.
Definition 2.8. (Structure entropy of a graph with a module function by a coding tree) Let G = (V,E) be a
graph, g be a module function of G, and T be a coding tree of G. We define the structure entropy of G with
module function g by coding tree T as follows:
HTg (G) = −
∑
α6=λ,α∈ T
g(Tα)
vol(G)
· log2
vol(α)
vol(α−)
, (13)
where vol(G) is the volume of G, vol(β) is the volume of the vertices set Tβ , and α
− is the parent node of α in T .
Definition 2.9. (Structure entropy of a graph with a module function) Let G = (V,E) be a graph, and g be a
module function of G.
(1) The structure entropy of G with module function g is defined as
Hg(G) = min
T
{HTg (G)}, (14)
where T ranges over all the coding trees of G.
(2) For natural numberK , theK-dimensional structure entropy of G with module function g is defined as
HKg (G) = min
T
{HTg (G)}, (15)
where T ranges over all the coding trees of G of heights at mostK .
[Remark: This allows us to study the structure entropy in different dimensions.]
The formulaHTg (G) = −
∑
α6=λ,α∈ T
g(Tα)
vol(G) · log2
vol(α)
vol(α−) is a generalization of H
T (G) in Definition 2.5 with
the function g here being an arbitrarily given module function, while the function g in Definition 2.5 is the cut
module function, that is, the number of edges in the cut.
In Definitions 2.8 and 2.9, the structure entropy of graph G depends on a choice of a module function g. It is
possible that there are many interesting choices for the module function g. We list a few of these as example:
(i) For a subsetX of vertices V , g(X) is the volume ofX . In this case, g is called the volume module function.
(ii) For each subset X of V , g(X) is the weights in the cut (X, X¯) in G. In this case, we say that g is the cut
module function.
(iii) For a directed graph G and for each subset X of V , g(X) is the weights of the flow from X¯ to X . In this
case, we call g the flow module function.
For directed graphs, the flow module function would be essential to the structure entropy of the graphs.
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In particular, there are module functions with additivity, with which the structure entropy collapses to the case
of Shannon entropy.
Definition 2.10. (Additive module function) Let G = (V,E) be a connected, simple graph with n vertices andm
edges, and g be a module function of G. We say that g is an additive module function if for any disjoint sets X
and Y of V ,
g(X ∪ Y ) = g(X) + g(Y ). (16)
Theorem 2.1. (Structural entropy of a graph with an additive function) Let G = (V,E) be a connected, simple
graph with n vertices, andm edges, and let g be an additive module function of G. For any coding tree T of g, if
g satisfies the boundary condition
g(Tα) =
{
dα α is a leaf
2m α = λ
,
then
HTg (G) = −
n∑
i=1
di
2m
· log2
di
2m
. (17)
Proof. By Definition 2.8, noting that for every α ∈ T , let gα = g(Tα) and Vα = vol(α), we have:
HTg (G) = −
∑
α6=λ,α∈ T
gα
2m
· log2
Vα
Vα−
= −
∑
α6=λ,α∈ T
gα
2m
· log2 Vα +
∑
α6=λ,α∈ T
gα
2m
· log2 Vα−
= −
∑
α6=λ,α∈ T
gα
2m
· log2 Vα + (
∑
α∈T, non-leaf
gα
2m
· log2 Vα + log2(2m)), by the additivity of g
= −
n∑
i=1
di
2m
· log2
di
2m
. (18)
The theorem follows.
Definition 2.11. (The length of the vertex accessible from random walk with stationary distribution) For a con-
nected, simple graph G = (V,E) of n vertices and m edges. Let g be the volume module function of G defined
as: for any set X of vertices V , g(X) is the volume of X . Suppose that T is a coding tree of G. Then:
HTg (G) = −
∑
α∈T,α6=λ
Vα
2m
· log2
Vα
Vα−
, (19)
where Vβ is the volume of Tβ , α
− is the parent node of α in T .
Remarks: In this case, HTg (G) is the amount of information required to describe the codeword in T of the
vertex that is accessible from random walk with stationary distribution in G, and is a lower bound of the average
length of the codeword (in T ) of the vertex that is accessible from random walk with stationary distribution in G.
Theorem 2.2. For any connected and simple graph G = (V,E) with n vertices and m edges. For the module
function g(X) =
∑
x∈X
dx, where dx is the degree of x in G, and for any coding tree T of G,
HTg (G) = −
n∑
i=1
di
2m
· log2
di
2m
= H1(G), (20)
where di is the degree of vertex i in G, H1(G) is the one-dimensional structural entropy of G [20].
Proof. Note that for any non-leaf node α ∈ T , Vα =
∑
β∈T,β−=α
Vβ , that is, Vα is an additive module function.
The theorem follows from Theorem 2.1.
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Theorem 2.2 shows that
• The information to describe the codeword of a tree of the vertex that is accessible from random walk with
stationary distribution in G is independent of any coding tree T of G, and
• The minimum average length, written L(G), of the codeword in a coding tree of the vertex that is accessible
from random walk with stationary distribution is greater than or equal to (or lower bounded by) the one-
dimensional structure entropy H1(G) [20], or the Shannon entropy of the degree distribution of the graph.
This means that
L(G) = Ω(log2 n), (21)
where n is the number of vertices in G.
This property is in sharp contrast to the structure entropy. In fact, there are many graphs G such that the
two-dimensional structure entropyH2(G) = O(log2 log2 n), referred to [20].
The proof of Theorem 2.1 also shows the reason why the structure entropy in Definitions 2.5 and 2.6 depend
on the coding trees of a graph. The reason is that, the cut module function g in Definition 2.5 fails to have the
additivity, since for any two disjoint vertex sets X and Y , if there are edges betweenX and Y , then g(X ∪ Y ) <
g(X) + g(Y ). This ensures that the structure entropy HT (G) in Definition 2.5 depends on the coding tree T of
G. For this reason, the structure entropy provides the foundation for a new direction of information theory with
rich theory and remarkable applications in many areas.
2.7 The relationship between Shannon entropy and the structure entropy
Given a connected graph G = (V,E), Theorem 2.2 implies that the information to describe the vertex that is
accessible from random walk with stationary distribution cannot be reduced by any coding tree of the the graph,
so that the average length of the codewords of the vertex that is accessible from random walk with stationary
distribution must be lower bounded by the entropy of the degree distribution of the graph.
However, the structure entropy of a graph defined in Definition 2.5 is determined by the coding tree of the
graph, and hence the structure entropy is given in Definition 2.6. We have seen in [20], that there are graphs
G whose two-dimensional structure entropy is H2(G) = O(log2 log2 n). This means that coding trees play an
essential role in controlling a network by reducing the uncertainty of the interactions in the network.
Theorems 2.1 and 2.2, together with the theory in [20] imply that structure entropy of a graph involves one
more measure of the graph, which is the module function of graphs. This means that the variant of the structure
entropy given in Definitions 2.8 and 2.9 is well-defined. In particular, using this variant of structure entropy, we
are able to establish a new theory of structure entropy for directed graphs, in which case, the flow module function
plays a role (project in progress).
The comparison between Shannon entropy and our structure entropy also suggests some interesting open
questions. For example, Shannon entropy can be understood as the tight lower bound of the length of the binary
expression of the item picked by the probabilistic distribution, and the tight lower bound for the number of bits
required to guess the item chosen by the probabilistic distribution, and so on. Some of these measures such as
the length of the binary expression is intuitive and concrete, and has geometric and physical meaning. However,
the structure entropy has no such intuition. It is an open question to find a geometric or physical interpretation
for the structure entropy in Definitions 2.5 and 2.6. Of course, the fundamental feature of structure entropy is that
structure plays a role in information theory. This new feature leads to both information theoretical approach to
graph theory and graphic approach to information theory, accompanying with the new notions of coding trees and
module functions etc.
3 Resistance of Networks
In this section, we propose the notion of resistance and security index of a graph. The notions are built by using the
one- and two-dimensional structure entropy introduced in [20]. We recall the one- and two-dimensional structure
entropy [20].
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3.1 One- and two-dimensional structure entropy
According to Definition 2.5, the one-dimensional structure entropy of a graph G has the following form: Let
G = (V,E) be a connected graph with n vertices and m edges. For each vertex i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}, let di be the
degree of i in G, and let pi = di/2m. Then the vector p = (p1, p2, · · · , pn) is the stationary distribution of a
randomwalk inG. By using this, we define the one-dimensional structure entropy or positioning entropy ofG by:
H1(G) = H(p) = H
(
d1
2m
, . . . ,
dn
2m
)
= −
n∑
i=1
di
2m
· log2
di
2m
. (22)
By Definition 2.5, we have:
Definition 3.1. (Structure entropy of G by a partition, [20]) Given a connected graph G = (V,E), suppose that
P = {X1, X2, · · · , XL} is a partition of V . We define the structure entropy of G by P as follows:
HP(G) :=
L∑
j=1
Vj
2m
·H
(
d
(j)
1
Vj
, . . . ,
d
(j)
nj
Vj
)
−
L∑
j=1
gj
2m
log2
Vj
2m
= −
L∑
j=1
Vj
2m
nj∑
i=1
d
(j)
i
Vj
log2
d
(j)
i
Vj
−
L∑
j=1
gj
2m
log2
Vj
2m
, (23)
where L is the number of modules in partition P , nj is the number of vertices in moduleXj , d
(j)
i is the degree of
the i-th vertex in Xj , Vj is the volume of module Xj , and gj is the number of edges with exactly one endpoint in
module j.
According to the definition, HP(G) is the average number of bits required to determine the code (i, j) of the
vertex of the graph that is accessible from random walk with stationary distribution in G, where i is the code of
the vertex in its own module, and j is the code of the module of the accessible vertex in the whole networkG.
Now we turn to define the two-dimensional structure entropy of G.
Definition 3.2. (Two-dimensional structure entropy, [20]) Given a connected graphG, define the structure entropy
of G by:
H2(G) = min
P
{HP(G)}, (24)
where P runs over all the partitions of G.
Clearly, the definition ofH2(G) in Definition 3.2 is the same as that in Definition 2.9 forK = 2.
For the one- and two-dimensional structure entropy, we will use some fundamental results from [20]:
Theorem 3.1. (Lower bound of one-dimensional structure entropy of simple graphs) Let G = (V,E) be an
undirected, connected, and simple graph withm edges, i.e., |E| = m. Then:
H1(G) ≥
1
2
(log2m− 1) .
Theorem 3.2. (Lower bound of one-dimensional structure entropy of graphs of balanced weights) LetG = (V,E)
be a connected graph with weight functionw. Letm = |E| be the number of edges. If the ratio of maximumweight
and minimum weight is at mostmǫ, that is maxe∈G{w(e)}mine∈G{w(e)} ≤ m
ǫ, for some constant ǫ < 1, then:
H1(G) ≥
1
2
[(1− ǫ) log2m− 1] .
Given a graphG = (V,E), and a subset S of V , the conductance of S in G is given by
Φ(S) =
|E(S, S¯)|
min{vol(S), vol(S¯)}
, (25)
whereE(S, S¯) is the set of edges with one endpoint in S and the other in the complement of S, i.e. S¯, and vol(X)
is the sum of degrees dx for all x ∈ X . The conductance of G is defined to be the minimum of Φ(S) over all
subsets S’s, that is:
Φ(G) = min
S⊂V
{Φ(S)}. (26)
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Theorem 3.3. (Two-dimensional structure entropy principle) For any graph G, the two-dimensional structure
entropy of G follows:
H2(G) ≥ Φ(G) · H1(G), (27)
where Φ(G) is the conductance of G, andH1(G) is the one-dimensional structure entropy of G.
Theorem 3.4. (Lower bounds of two-dimensional structure entropy of simple graphs) Let G = (V,E) be an
undirected, connected and simple graph with number of edges |E| = m. Then the two-dimensional structure
entropy of G satisfies
H2(G) = Ω(log2 log2m). (28)
[Remark: In [20], the authors first defined the one- and two-dimensional structure entropy and then extended
to the high-dimensional cases. In that paper, we used the notion “partitioning tree” in the definition of high
dimensional structure entropy. Here we use the notion of coding tree of a graph. We would hope that this new
notion is better for people to understand the structural information theory.]
The notion of structure entropy may have fundamental accompanying notions, for instance, noises, coding and
decoding etc. The authors introduced the notion of resistance as an accompanying notion of structure entropy in
[20]. It is interesting that resistance is determined only by the one- and two-dimensional structure entropy of the
graph.
Given a network G = (V,E), consider the following scenario: Suppose that there is a virus which randomly
spreads inG. Suppose that there is partition P ofG such that randomwalk inG with stationary distribution easily
goes to a small moduleX of P after which it is not easy to escape from the moduleX . In this case, the spreading
of the virus is restrained by the partition P ofG. To characterise the scenario, we define the resistance of G given
by partition P .
Definition 3.3. (Resistance of a graph by a partition P , Li and Pan [20]) Let G = (V,E) be a connected graph
and P be a partition of G. The resistance of G given by P is defined as follows:
RP (G) = −
L∑
j=1
Vj − gj
2m
log2
Vj
2m
, (29)
where Vj is the volume of the j-th moduleXj of P , and gj is the number of edges from Xj to the vertices outside
Xj .
We define the notion of resistance of a graphG.
Definition 3.4. (Resistance of networks, Li and Pan [20]) Let G be a connected graph. We define the resistance
of G as follows:
R(G) = max
P
{RP(G)}, (30)
where P runs over all the partitions of G.
Intuitively, the resistanceR(G)measures the force ofG to resist the cascading failure of virus attacks inG. As
a matter of fact, the authors and their coauthors have shown experimentally that the resistance of a network does
measure the force of the network to resist cascading failures of virus attacks [16], and that resistance maximization
is the principle for defending the networks from virus attacks [21].
For the resistance of graphG by P , we have the following resistance principle of networks.
Theorem 3.5. (Resistance principle, Li and Pan, [20]) Let G = (V,E) be a connected graph. Suppose that P is
a partition of V with the notations the same as that in the definitions ofH1(G) andHP(G). Then the positioning
entropy of G, H1(G), and the structure entropy of G by given P , i.e.,HP(G), satisfy the following properties:
(1) (Additivity law of one-dimensional structure entropy) The positioning entropy of G satisfies:
H1(G) = −
L∑
j=1
Vj
2m
nj∑
i=1
d
(j)
i
Vj
log2
d
(j)
i
Vj
−
L∑
j=1
Vj
2m
log2
Vj
2m
. (31)
(2) (Local resistance law of networks)
RP(G) = −
L∑
j=1
Vj − gj
2m
log2
Vj
2m
= H1(G)−HP(G) (32)
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(3) Assume that for each j, Vj ≤ m, form = |E|. Then
RP(G) = −
L∑
j=1
(1− Φ(Xj))
Vj
2m
log2
Vj
2m
= H1(G) −HP(G) (33)
where Φ(Xj) is the conductance ofXj in G.
By the local resistance law in Theorem 3.5, we have:
Theorem 3.6. (Global resistance law of networks, Li and Pan [20]) Let G be a connected graph. Then, we have
R(G) = H1(G)−H2(G). (34)
Proof. By Theorem 3.5.
According to Theorem 3.6, we define the security index of a graph G to be the normalised resistance of G.
That is,
Definition 3.5. (Security index of a graph) Let G be a connected graph. We define the security index of graph G
as follows:
θ(G) =
R(G)
H1(G)
. (35)
By the definition in Equation (30) and the resistance principle of networks by partitions, we have that the
resistance of a connected graphG satisfies:
According to Theorem 3.6, for a connected graphG, we have:
R(G) = H1(G)−H2(G).
Notice thatH2(G) ≤ H1(G).
By the definition of security index in Equation (35) and by the result in Equation (34), we have that the security
index of a connected graphG satisfies the following:
θ(G) = 1−
H2(G)
H1(G)
. (36)
Based on the security index, we introduce the following:
Definition 3.6. (Resistor graph) Let G = (V,E) be a connected graph of n vertices and m edges. Let θ be a
number in (0, 1). We say that G is an (n, θ)-resistor graph, if:
θ(G) ≥ θ. (37)
By Theorem 3.3, for any expander graphG, the conductanceΦ(G) is a large constant α, therefore, the security
index of G is θ(G) < 1− α for a large constant α. This means that expanders are not good resistor graphs.
4 Basic Theorems for Classic Structures
Trees and grid graphs perhaps are the most natural and most frequently used data structures. The authors [20]
have established some lower and upper bounds of the K-dimensional structure entropy of the graphs. Here we
prove the basic theorems of the resistances and security indices of the classical data structures.
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4.1 Resistance and security index of trees
In this subsection, we consider the resistance and security indices of complete binary trees. Similar results can be
generalized easily to any trees with constant bounded degrees. A complete binary tree is a tree whose non-leaf
nodes has exactly two children and every leaf node has the same depth (In this section, for notational simplicity,
we define the depth of a node to be the number of nodes on the unique path from this node to the root). So the
complete binary tree of depthH has exactly 2H − 1 nodes.
Theorem 4.1. Let T be a complete binary tree of depthH and thus of size n = 2H − 1. Then:
(1) The resistance of T isR(T ) ≥ log2 n− log2 log2 n− 5− o(1) = (1− o(1)) · log2 n, and
(2) The security index of T is θ(T ) ≥ 1− log2 log2 nlog2 n
−O
(
1
log2 n
)
= 1− o(1).
Proof. We will prove that
(i) H1(T ) ≥ log2 n− 1, and
(ii) H2(T ) ≤ log2 log2 n+ 4 + o(1).
Then Theorem 4.1 follows immediately.
To calculate H1(T ), note that in T , there are 2H − 1 nodes, and one of them is the root of degree 2, 2H−1 of
them are leaves of degree 1, and 2H−1 − 2 of them are intermediate nodes of degree 3. The total volume of T is
thus 2H+1 − 4. So
H1(T ) = −
2
2H+1 − 4
log2
2
2H+1 − 4
− (2H−1 − 2) ·
3
2H+1 − 4
log2
3
2H+1 − 4
−2H−1 ·
1
2H+1 − 4
log2
1
2H+1 − 4
=
1
2H − 2
log2(2
H − 2) +
[
3(2H−2 − 1) + 2H−2
2H − 2
]
log2(2
H+1 − 4)
−
3(2H−2 − 1)
2H − 2
log2 3
= log2(2
H − 2) +
2H − 3
2H − 2
−
3(2H − 4)
4(2H − 2)
log2 3
≥ H − 1
≥ log2 n− 1.
To prove H2(T ) ≤ log2 log2 n + 4 + o(1), it suffices to define a partition P of the nodes in T such that
HP(T ) ≤ log2 log2 n + 4 + o(1). We define P as follows. Let 1 ≤ k ≤ H be an integer. We partition every
subtree whose root is a node of depth H − k + 1 as a module and the remaining part consisting of all the nodes
of depth at most H − k as a module. Now we have 2H−k complete binary subtrees, each of which, denoted by
Tj , j = 1, 2, . . . , 2
H−k, has a size 2k − 1 and another complete binary subtree, denoted by T ′, which has a size
2H−k − 1. A simple calculation indicates that for each Tj , its volume vol(Tj) = 2k+1 − 3, and the volume of T ′
is vol(T ′) = 3 · 2H−k − 4.
For each Tj , we have
−
∑
v∈Tj
dv
2m
log2
dv
vol(Tj)
= −(2k−1 − 1) ·
3
2m
log2
3
2k+1 − 3
− 2k−1 ·
1
2m
log2
1
2k+1 − 3
≤
1
2m
[
(2k−1 − 1) · 3(k + 1) + 2k−1(k + 1)
]
≤
2k+1
2m
(k + 1).
So
−
2H−k∑
j=1
vol(Tj)
2m
∑
v∈Tj
dv
vol(Tj)
log2
dv
vol(Tj)
= −
2H−k∑
j=1
∑
v∈Tj
dv
vol(Tj)
log2
dv
vol(Tj)
≤ 2H−k ·
2k+1
2m
(k + 1).
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Note that each Tj has exactly one global edge connecting to T
′. So the number of global edges for each Tj is
gj = 1. We have
−
2H−k∑
j=1
gj
2m
log2
vol(Tj)
2m
= −2H−k ·
1
2m
log2
2k+1 − 3
2m
=
2H−k
2m
·
[
log2 2m− (k + 1) +O
(
1
2k
)]
.
Then consider the subtree T ′. Note that all the nodes in T ′ except for the root of T which has degree 2, have
degree 3. So
−
∑
v∈T ′
dv
2m
log2
dv
vol(T ′)
= −(2H−k − 2) ·
3
2m
log2
3
3 · 2H−k − 4
−
2
2m
log2
2
3 · 2H−k − 4
≤
2H−k
2m
· 3(H − k).
Note that T ′ has gT ′ = 2
H−k global edges, each of which joins a subtree Tj . We have
−
gT ′
2m
log2
vol(T ′)
2m
= −
2H−k
2m
log2
3 · 2H−k − 4
2m
=
2H−k
2m
·
[
log2 2m− (H − k) +O
(
1
2H−k
)]
.
So in all, noting that log2 2m = log2(2
H+1 − 4) ≤ H + 1, the structure entropy of T by partition P is
HP(T ) = −
2H−k∑
j=1
vol(Tj)
2m
∑
v∈Tj
dv
vol(Tj)
log2
dv
vol(Tj)
−
2H−k∑
j=1
gj
2m
log2
vol(Tj)
2m
−
∑
v∈T ′
dv
2m
log2
dv
vol(T ′)
−
gT ′
2m
log2
vol(T ′)
2m
≤
2H−k
2m
· 2k+1(k + 1) +
2H−k
2m
·
[
log2 2m− (k + 1) +O
(
1
2k
)]
+
2H−k
2m
· 3(H − k) +
2H−k
2m
·
[
log2 2m− (H − k) +O
(
1
2H−k
)]
≤
2H−k
2H+1 − 4
·
[
(2k+1 + 1)(k + 1) + 4(H − k) +O
(
1
2k
)
+O
(
1
2H−k
)]
≤ (k + 1) +
4(H − k)
2k+1
+O
(
k + 1
2k
+
k + 1
2H−k
+
H − k
2H
)
.
When we choose k + 1 = ⌈log2H⌉, the above value is at most ⌈log2H⌉+ 4 + o(1), which is log2 log2 n+
4 + o(1). Theorem 4.1 follows.
4.2 Resistance and security index of grid graphs
In this subsection, we consider the resistance and the security indices of grid graphs. An n × n grid G = (V,E)
is a graph defined on the vertex set V = {vi,j : i, j ∈ Z+, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n} and the edge set E = {(vi,j , vi,j′ ) :
|j − j′| = 1}
⋃
{(vi,j , vi′,j) : |i− i′| = 1}.
Theorem 4.2. Let G = (V,E) be an n× n grid graph. Then the resistance and the security index of G satisfies:
(1) The resistance of G isR(G) ≥ log2[n(n− 1)]− 2 log2 log2 n−O(1)), and
(2) The security index of G is ρ(G) ≥ 1− 2 log2 log2 nlog2[n(n−1)]
−O
(
1
log2 n
)
.
Proof. We will prove that
(i) H1(G) ≥ log2[n(n− 1)], and
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(ii) H2(G) ≤ 2 log2 log2 n+O(1).
Then Theorem 4.2 follows.
To calculate H1(G), note that in a n× n grid, there are four vertices (corners) of degree 2, 4(n− 2) vertices
(sides) of degree 3 and (n− 2)2 vertices of degree 4. The total volume of G is thus 4n(n− 1). So
H1(G) = −4 ·
2
4n(n− 1)
log2
2
4n(n− 1)
− 4(n− 2)
3
4n(n− 1)
log2
3
4n(n− 1)
−(n− 2)2
4
4n(n− 1)
log2
4
4n(n− 1)
=
[
2
n(n− 1)
+
3(n− 2)
n(n− 1)
+
(n− 2)2
n(n− 1)
]
· log2[n(n− 1)]
+
3(n− 2)(2− log2 3) + 2
n(n− 1)
= log2[n(n− 1)] +
3(n− 2)(2− log2 3) + 2
n(n− 1)
≥ log2[n(n− 1)].
To proveH2(G) ≤ 2 log2 log2 n+ O(1), similarly to the proof of Theorem 4.1, we find a partition P for the
vertices in G to witness the upper bound. We divide G into sub-grids of size k × k. For notational simplicity,
assume that n can be divided by k. So we have exactly
(
n
k
)2
such sub-grids. For each sub-grid, denoted by Gj ,
let d
(j)
i denote the degree of the i-th vertex, which is 4 for most vertices, 3 for border vertices and 2 for corner
vertices ofG. By the extremum property of the entropy functionH(·), the positioning entropy withinGj satisfies
H
(
d
(j)
1
vol(Gj)
, · · · ,
d
(j)
k2
vol(Gj)
)
≤ log2 k
2 = 2 log2 k.
So ∑
j
vol(Gj)
2m
·H
(
d
(j)
1
vol(Gj)
, · · · ,
d
(j)
k2
vol(Gj)
)
≤ 2 log2 k.
Since the total number of global edges is ∑
j
gj = 2n
(n
k
− 1
)
,
and noting thatm = 2n(n− 1), we have
−
∑
j
gj
2m
log2
vol(Gj)
2m
≤
∑
j
gj
 · 1
2m
log2 2m ≤
n− k
2k(n− 1)
· (2 log2 n+ 2) ≤
log2 n+ 1
k
.
So in all, we have that the structure entropy of G by partition P is
HP(G) =
∑
j
vol(Gj)
2m
·H
(
d
(j)
1
vol(Gj)
, · · · ,
d
(j)
k2
vol(Gj)
)
−
∑
j
gj
2m
log2
vol(Gj)
2m
≤ 2 log2 k +
log2 n+ 1
k
.
Let k = Θ(log2 n), thenH
P(G) ≤ 2 log2 log2 n+O(1). Theorem 4.2 follows.
Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 show that the classical graphs such as trees and grid graphs can be used as the basic
module of secure networks. This is a surprising result, since it means that secure networks may be constructed by
using the basic structures.
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5 Resistance of Bounded Degree Graphs
In this section, we give a lower bound for the resistance of regular graphs.
Theorem 5.1. Let G = (V,E) be a simple, connected graph of bounded degree d for some constant d. Then
R(G) ≥
(
2
d
− o(1)
)
· log2 n. (38)
Proof. We only have to show that there is a partition P = V1 ∪ V2 ∪ · · · ∪ VL, such that
R(G) ≥ H1(G) −HP(G) = −
L∑
j=1
(1− Φ(Vj)) ·
vol(Vj)
vol(G)
log2
vol(Vj)
vol(G)
≥
(
2
d
− o(1)
)
· log2 n. (39)
Since G is connected, consider a spanning tree, denoted by T , of G. Since G has bounded degree, so is T .
Pick an arbitrary vertex r of T as the root. Then the depth of every other vertex v is the length of the unique path
from r to v, and every vertex on this path other than v is called an ancestor of v. We say that the k-th ancestor of
v is the one which has distance k from v.
We define a partition of vertices in T recursively in the following way. Let l = ⌊logd log2 n⌋ − 1 and denote
T0 = T . For i = 0, 1, 2, . . ., find the deepest vertex, denoted by vi, of Ti (break ties arbitrarily), and denote
by vi+1 the ancestor of vi which has distance l from vi. Take the subtree rooted by vi+1, denoted by Vi+1, as a
module, and then delete Ti+1 from Ti. This procedure will not end until Ti is empty. Suppose that the last module
is VL. Then P , V1 ∪ V2 ∪ · · · ∪ VL is a partition of V . Next, we show that for this partition P , Inequality (39) is
satisfied.
Note that each Ti has bounded degree d, and so the size of each Ti is at most d
l+1 ≤ log2 n, andL ≥ n/ log2 n.
Except for the last module VL, the size of each Vi is certainly at least l. For each Vi, since it is connected in the
spanning tree T of G, it is also connected in G. So there are at least |Vi| − 1 edges in G whose two endpoints are
both in Vi, and vol(Vi) ≥ 2(|Vi| − 1) + 1. Thus, for each Vi, we have
Φ(Vi) ≤
vol(Vi)− 2(|Vi| − 1)
vol(Vi)
≤
d|Vi| − 2(|Vi| − 1)
d|Vi|
= 1−
2
d
+
2
d|Vi|
.
Therefore, for sufficiently large n 1,
R(G) ≥ H1(G)−HP(G)
= −
L∑
j=1
(1− Φ(Vj)) ·
vol(Vj)
vol(G)
log2
vol(Vj)
vol(G)
≥ −
L∑
j=1
(
2
d
−
2
d|Vj |
)
·
vol(Vj)
vol(G)
log2
vol(Vj)
vol(G)
≥ −
L−1∑
j=1
(
2
d
−
2
dl
)
·
vol(Vj)
vol(G)
log2
vol(Vj)
vol(G)
≥
2
d
·
(
1−
1
l
)
·
vol(G)− vol(VL)
vol(G)
·
− L−1∑
j=1
vol(Vj)
vol(G)− vol(VL)
log2
vol(Vj)
vol(G)− vol(VL)

≥
2
d
·
(
1−
1
l
)
·
vol(G)− vol(VL)
vol(G)
· log2
vol(G)− vol(VL)
d log2 n
≥
2
d
·
(
1−
1
l
)
·
vol(G)− d log2 n
vol(G)
· log2
vol(G)− d log2 n
d log2 n
=
(
2
d
− o(1)
)
· log2 n.
This completes the proof of the theorem.
1In this paper, whenever we say a proposition holds for “sufficiently large” values, we mean that there is some large enough value such that
the proposition holds for all values larger than this one
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6 Resistance of Complete Graphs
As mentioned before, Theorem 3.3 indicates that expander graphs are not good resistor graphs.
In this section, we analyze the resistance of the “most expanding” graphs, i.e., the complete graphs. We show
that the resistance of a complete graph is as low as a constant O(1). First, we answer the following question:
When a partition P is given on a graph, to achieve a larger resistance (or equivalently, a smaller two-dimensional
structural information) from P , how to split or merge the modules in P . For two subsets of vertices X and Y ,
denote by e(X,Y ) the number of edges whose one endpoint is in X and the other in Y . The following lemma
gives the criteria.
Lemma 6.1. (Merging-Splitting Lemma) Let G = (V,E) be a regular graph. Let P1 = X1 ∪X2 ∪ · · · ∪XL and
P2 = Y1 ∪ Y2 ∪X2 ∪ · · · ∪XL be two partitions of V whose only difference is the module X1 in P1 being split
into two modules Y1 ∪ Y2 in P2. ThenHP2(G) ≥ HP1(G) if and only if
e(Y1, Y2) · log2
n
|X1|
≥ e(Y1, Y1) · log2
|X1|
|Y1|
+ e(Y2, Y2) · log2
|X1|
|Y2|
,
andHP2(G) ≤ HP1(G) if and only if
e(Y1, Y2) · log2
n
|X1|
≤ e(Y1, Y1) · log2
|X1|
|Y1|
+ e(Y2, Y2) · log2
|X1|
|Y2|
.
Proof. The proof is straightforward. For any non-empty subset of verticesX , letH(X) denote the entropy of the
degree distribution of vertices in X . By Definition 3.1,
HP2(G) −HP1(G) =
(
vol(Y1)
vol(G)
·H(Y1) +
vol(Y2)
vol(G)
·H(Y2)−
vol(X1)
vol(G)
·H(X1)
)
−
(
Φ(Y1) ·
vol(Y1)
vol(G)
log2
vol(Y1)
vol(G)
+ Φ(Y2) ·
vol(Y2)
vol(G)
log2
vol(Y2)
vol(G)
−Φ(X1) ·
vol(X1)
vol(G)
log2
vol(X1)
vol(G)
)
=
(
vol(Y1)
vol(G)
· log2 |Y1|+
vol(Y2)
vol(G)
· log2 |Y2| −
vol(Y1) + vol(Y2)
vol(G)
· log2 |X1|
)
−
(
e(Y1, Y 1)
vol(G)
log2
vol(Y1)
vol(G)
+
e(Y2, Y 2)
vol(G)
log2
vol(Y2)
vol(G)
−
e(X1, X1)
vol(G)
log2
vol(X1)
vol(G)
)
(Note that e(X1, X1) = e(Y1, Y 1) + e(Y2, Y 2)− 2e(Y1, Y2))
=
(
vol(Y1)
vol(G)
· log2
|Y1|
|X1|
+
vol(Y2)
vol(G)
· log2
|Y2|
|X1|
)
−
(
e(Y1, Y 1)
vol(G)
· log2
vol(Y1)
vol(X1)
+
e(Y2, Y 2)
vol(G)
· log2
vol(Y2)
vol(X1)
+
2e(Y1, Y2)
vol(G)
· log2
vol(X1)
vol(G)
)
(Note that G is regular)
=
vol(Y1)− e(Y1, Y 1)
vol(G)
· log2
|Y1|
|X1|
+
vol(Y2)− e(Y2, Y 2)
vol(G)
· log2
|Y2|
|X1|
−
2e(Y1, Y2)
vol(G)
· log2
vol(X1)
vol(G)
=
2e(Y1, Y1)
vol(G)
· log2
|Y1|
|X1|
+
2e(Y2, Y2)
vol(G)
· log2
|Y2|
|X1|
−
2e(Y1, Y2)
vol(G)
· log2
|X1|
n
.
SoHP2(G) ≥ HP1(G) if and only if
e(Y1, Y2) · log2
n
|X1|
≥ e(Y1, Y1) · log2
|X1|
|Y1|
+ e(Y2, Y2) · log2
|X1|
|Y2|
,
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andHP2(G) ≤ HP1(G) if and only if
e(Y1, Y2) · log2
n
|X1|
≤ e(Y1, Y1) · log2
|X1|
|Y1|
+ e(Y2, Y2) · log2
|X1|
|Y2|
.
The lemma follows.
By Lemma 6.1, we know that to reduce the structure information, a large module (large |X1|) tends to split
into pieces (in the case that HP2(G) < HP1(G)), while small modules (small |Y1| and |Y2|) tend to merge into
big ones (in the case thatHP2(G) > HP1(G)).
For complete graphs, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 6.1. Let G be a complete graph with n vertices. Then
R(G) = O(1). (40)
Proof. In the complete graph G of size n, since each vertex has degree n − 1, a subset of vertices of size x has
volume (n− 1)x and conductance (n− x)/(n− 1), vol(G) = n(n− 1).
Suppose that P = V1 ∪ V2 ∪ · · · ∪ VL be the partition of V such that H2(G) = HP(G). Let nj = |Vj | for
each j ∈ [L]. Then
R(G) = −
L∑
j=1
(1− Φ(Vj)) ·
vol(Vj)
vol(G)
log2
vol(Vj)
vol(G)
= −
L∑
j=1
(
1−
n− nj
n− 1
)
·
nj
n
log2
nj
n
= −
L∑
j=1
(nj − 1)nj
(n− 1)n
log2
nj
n
.
Next, we prove that when P makes HP(G) minimized, the size of modules in P should be the same 2. Suppose
that x and y are the sizes of two modules and x+ y = a for some fixed a. We will show that when other modules
are fixed, averaging x and y, that is x = y = a/2, or x = 0 while y = a, or x = a while y = 0 makes the
structural information (under this partition) minimized. This means that for two modules in a partition, to reduce
the structure information, they tend to be have the same size, or merge into a single module. This holds for every
pair of modules, which implies that the module sizes in the optimal partition are averaged.
Note that
(n− 1)n · R(G) = −
L∑
j=1
(nj − 1)nj · log2
nj
n
.
We only have to show that the function
f(x) , −x(x− 1) · log2
x
n
− (a− x)(a− x− 1) · log2
a− x
n
achieves maximum at x = a/2, or 0, or a, when 0 ≤ x ≤ a. The first derivative and the second derivative of f(x)
satisfies
ln 2 · f ′(x) = −(2x− 1) · lnx− [2(x− a) + 1] · ln(a− x) + 2(2x− a) · lnn+ (a− 2x),
ln 2 · f ′′(x) = −2 · ln[x(a − x)] +
a
x(a− x)
+ 4 · lnn− 6.
Note that the function
g(x) = −2 · lnx+
a
x
+ 4 · lnn− 6
strictly decreases monotonically for x > 0. There is at most one root for g(x), and consequently, there are at
most two roots for f ′′(x), and thus, there are at most two inflection points for f ′(x). Observing that f ′(a/2) = 0,
limx→0+ f
′(x) = −∞ and limx→a− f ′(x) = +∞, we know that there are at most three maximal values and two
2Since the size of a module should be an integer, here we say that two modules has the same size if the deficit is at most one. But for the
notational simplicity, we assume that n can always be divided by the parameters we suppose, and the error will be absorbed in the notation
O(·).
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minimal values for f(x) in the interval [0, a] because of at most two inflection points in this interval, and these
three (possible) maximal points take values at x = 0 or a/2 or a. This means that x = y = a/2, or x = 0 while
y = a, or x = a while y = 0 makes the structural information minimized when other modules are fixed.
So from now on, we can suppose that x is the size of each modules in P , and so L = n/x (suppose that n can
be divided by x). We have
(n− 1)n · R(G) = −
n
x
(x− 1)x · log2
x
n
= −n(x− 1) · log2
x
n
.
Define function
h(x) , ln 2 · (n− 1) · R(G) = −(x− 1) · ln
x
n
.
To compute the maximum value of h(x), note that
h′(x) = ln
n
x
+
1
x
− 1,
h′′(x) = −
x+ 1
x2
< 0.
Thus, h(x) takes the maximum value at x = x0 where x0 is the unique root of h
′(x). That is,
ln
x0
n
=
1
x0
− 1.
Therefore,
h(x0) = −(x0 − 1) · ln
x0
n
= x0 +
1
x0
− 2 ≤ n+
1
n
− 2.
So
R(G) ≤
n+ 1n − 2
ln 2 · (n− 1)
=
1
ln 2
·
n− 1
n
< log2 e.
Adding the error caused by the deficit of module sizes, we have R(G) = O(1). This completes the proof of the
theorem.
In the above proof, note that h′(n/e) > 0, and when n ≥ 7, h′(n/2) < 0, which means that n/e < x0 < n/2,
and in the optimal partition P , the number of modules L = 2 or 3 while each module has size n/2 or n/3 for
n ≥ 7. Theorem 6.1 means that any partition P of the complete graph saves only a constant bits of information.
Theorem 6.1 indicates that the resistance of the complete graphs isO(1), and the security index of the complete
graphs is O( 1log2 n
) = o(1), where n is the number of vertices of the graph, so that the complete graphs are far
from resistor graphs.
The arguments above clearly indicate that
Theorem 6.2. For arbitrarily small constant ǫ > 0, there is an N such that for any n ≥ N , the complete graph
of n vertices cannot be an (n, ǫ)-resistor graph.
Proof. By the proof of Theorem 6.1.
7 Resistance and Security Index of the Networks of the Security Model
Li, Li, Pan and Zhang [18] proposed the security model of networks. Here we establish the theory of resistance
and security index of the networks generated by the security model.
The model proceeds as follows.
Definition 7.1. (Security model, [18]) Given a homophyly (or affinity) exponent a ≥ 0 and a natural number d,
1) Let Gn0 be an initial graph of size n0 such that each vertex has a distinct color and called seed, where n0
is an arbitrary positive integer.
For each step i > n0, let Gi−1 be the graph constructed at the end of step i− 1, and pi = 1/(log i)a.
2) At step i, we create a new vertex, v.
3) With probability pi, v chooses a new color, in which case,
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i) we call v a seed,
ii) (preferential attachment) create an edge (v, u) where u is chosen with probability proportional to the
degrees of vertices in Gi−1, and
iii) (randomness) create d− 1 edges (v, uj), where each uj is chosen randomly and uniformly among all
seed vertices in Gi−1.
4) Otherwise, then v chooses an old color, in which case,
i) (randomness) v chooses uniformly and randomly an old color as its own color and
ii) (homophyly and preferential attachment) create d edges (v, uj), where uj is chosen with probability
proportional to the degrees of all vertices of the same color as that of v in Gi−1.
We use S(n, a, d) to denote the model with affinity exponent a, average number of edges d and number of
vertices n.
The authors [19] have shown that
1. (Uniform threshold security theorem) Let G be a graph constructed from S(n, a, d) with pi = log
−a i for
homophyly exponent a > 4 and for d ≥ 4. Let the uniform threshold φ = O
(
1
logb n
)
for b = a2 − 2− ǫ for
arbitrarily small ǫ > 0.
Then with probability 1 − o(1) (over the construction of G), there is no initial set of poly-logarithmic size
which causes a cascading failure set of non-negligible size. Precisely, we have that for any constant c > 0,
Pr
G∈RS(n,a,d), G=(V,E)
[
∀S ⊆ V, |S| = ⌈logc n⌉, |infφG(S)| = o(n)
]
= 1− o(1),
where infφG(S) is the infection set of S in G with uniform threshold φ.
2. (Random threshold security theorem) Let a > 6 be the homophyly exponent, and d ≥ 4. Suppose that G is
a graph generated from S(n, a, d).
Then with probability 1 − o(1) (over the construction of G), there is no initial set of poly-logarithmic size
which causes a cascading failure set of non-negligible size. Formally, we have that for any constant c > 0,
Pr
G∈RS(n,a,d), G=(V,E)
[
∀S ⊆ V, |S| = ⌈logc n⌉, |infRG(S)| = o(n)
]
= 1− o(1).
In the present paper, we establish the resistance and security indices of the network of the security model.
Theorem 7.1. (Resistance theorem of the networks of the security model) Given affinity exponent a > 0 and
natural number d > 1, let G = (V,E) be a network of the security model with n vertices, affinity exponent a and
average number of edges d. Then, with probability 1− o(1),
1. the resistance of G is R(G) = Ω(logn), and
2. the security index of G is θ(G) = 1− o(1).
Theorem 7.1 ensures that for every affinity exponent a > 0 and for every edge parameter d, for the networks
of the security model with affinity a and edge parameter d and with sufficiently large number of vertices n, with
probability ≈ 1, the resistances of the networks are as large as Ω(log n), and the security indices of the networks
are close to 1. Therefore the networks are secure against cascading failures of arbitrarily strategic virus attacks.
The proof of Theorem 7.1 consists of two parts, the first part is a lower bound of one-dimensional structure
entropy of the networks, and the second part is the two-dimensional structure entropy of the networks.
For the first part, we use Theorems 3.1 and 3.2.
Therefore, for simple or balanced graphsG, we have:
H1(G) = Ω(log n). (41)
For the second part, we investigate the structure entropy of the networks given by the natural partition classified
by colors.
Let G = (V,E) ∈ S(n, a, d) be a network of n vertices generated from our Security model. Every vertex is
associated with a color, we say that the classification of the vertices by colors is the natural community structure of
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G. In so doing, a natural community ofG is a maximal homochromatic set. We note that each natural community
contains a seed, which is the first vertex specified in the community. We use N to denote the natural community
structure of G.
We approximate the two-dimensional structure entropy of G byHN (G).
First, we introduce some notations and basic probabilistic tools.
For every t, we use Gt to denote the graph obtained at the end of time step t of the construction of G, and Ct
to denote the set of seed vertices ofGt.
For an edge e = (u, v), we call e a local edge, if the two endpoints u, v share the same color, and a global
edge, otherwise.
The probabilistic bounds used are referred to the appendix.
For estimating HN (G), we establish the following fundamental properties of the networks generated by the
security model.
Theorem 7.2. (Fundamental theorem of the networks of the security model) Given a ≥ 0 and d ≥ 2, let G =
(V,E) be a graph of n vertices generated from S(n, a, d). Let T1 = log
a+1 n and T2 =
n
logb n
for some positive
constant b. Then the following properties hold.
(1) With probability 1− o(1), for all t ≥ T1,
t
2 loga t ≤ |Ct| ≤
2t
loga t .
(2) When a > 0, for each homochromatic set S, if t > tS ≥ T1, then the expectation of its size at time step t is
Θ(loga+1 t− loga+1 tS), where tS is the time step at which the seed vertex of S is created.
(3) With probability 1− o(1), every homochromatic set in G has a size upper bounded by 4 loga+1 n.
(4) For each homochromatic set S, if tS ≥ T2, then for sufficiently large n the number of global edges in G
associated to S, denoted by gS , satisfies that
(i) if a > 1, then E(gS) ≤
5
2 (a+ 1)b
2(log logn)2;
(ii) if a = 1, then E(gS) ≤ 8b2(log logn)2;
(iii) if 0 < a < 1, then E(gS) ≤ 5b2(log logn)2.
The proof of Theorem 7.2 is referred to the appendix.
Then we turn to prove Theorem 7.1.
Proof. (Proof of Theorem 7.1) According to Equation (41), it suffices to show that, when a > 0, with probability
1 − o(1), the two-dimensional structure entropy of G is H2(G) = o(log n), which is negligible compared to its
one-dimensional structure entropyH1(G). Thus, the resistance ofG is approximatelyH1(G), which is Ω(log n),
and the security index of G is 1− o(1).
To establish an upper bound for H2(G), it suffices to give a partition for the vertices in G with HP(G) =
o(log n). Let N be the natural partition given by the homochromatic sets.
Recall Equation (23)
HN (G) = −
L∑
j=1
Vj
2m
nj∑
i=1
d
(j)
i
Vj
log2
d
(j)
i
Vj
−
L∑
j=1
gj
2m
log2
Vj
2m
.
Set the first term of HN (G) by H1 = −
L∑
j=1
Vj
2m
nj∑
i=1
d
(j)
i
Vj
log2
d
(j)
i
Vj
, and for each homochromatic set Xj , set
Hj = −
nj∑
i=1
d
(j)
i
Vj
· log2
d
(j)
i
Vj
. By Theorem 7.2, with probability 1 − o(1), for each j, nj ≤ 4 log
a+1 n. Since the
uniform distribution gives rise to the maximum entropy, we have that with probability 1− o(1),
Hj ≤ log2 nj = O(log logn),
and by averaging, we have
H1 =
L∑
j=1
Vj
2m
Hj = O(log logn).
Moreover,
−
L∑
j=1
gj
2m
log2
Vj
2m
≤
L∑
j=1
gj
2m
log2 2m =
log2 2m
2m
·
L∑
j=1
gj .
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Let mg be the number of global edges in G. Then
∑L
j=1 gj = 2mg. By the construction of G, mg = d|Cn|,
where |Cn| is the number of colors in G (and also the number of homochromatic sets in G and the number of
modules in P). By Theorem 7.2, with probability 1 − o(1), the size |Cn| of Cn is at most 2n/ log
a n. Therefore
the second term ofHN (G) is
−
L∑
j=1
gj
2m
log2
Vj
2m
≤
log2 2m
2m
·
4dn
loga n
= O(log1−a n).
Putting all together, we have that, with probability 1− o(1),
HN (G) = H1 −
L∑
j=1
gj
2m
log2
Vj
2m
= O(log logn+ log1−a n).
So, if 0 < a < 1, then with probability 1− o(1),
HN (G) = O(log1−a n).
If a ≥ 1, then with probability 1− o(1),
HN (G) = O(log logn).
In both cases, HN (G) = o(logn). Theorem 7.1 follows.
8 Eigenvalues of the Laplacian of Resistor Graphs
In this section, we study the eigenvalues of the Laplacian of the resistor graphs. At first, we introduce some results
on high order Cheeger’s inequality which we will use.
Let G = (V,E) be an undirected graph with |V | = n and |E| = m. The Laplacian of G is defined to be the
n× n matrix L = I −D−1/2AD−1/2, where A is the adjacency matrix ofG andD is the diagonal matrix whose
(v, v)-th entry is the degree of vertex v. So the spectrum of L satisfies 0 = λ1 ≤ λ2 ≤ · · · ≤ λn ≤ 2, where λk is
the k-th eigenvalue of L.
For a subset of vertices S ⊆ V , define the conductance of S to be
Φ(S) =
|E(S, S)|
min{vol(S), vol(S)}
,
where |E(S, S)| is the number of edges between S and its complement S.
Lee, Gharan and Trevisan [15] defined the k-way conductance of a graphG as follows:
φ(k) = min
S1,S2,...,Sk
max
i∈[k]
{Φ(Si)},
where the minimum runs over all collections of disjoint non-empty subsets S1, S2, . . . , Sk ⊆ V .
The high-order Cheeger’s inequalities [15] state that the k-way conductance of G is bounded by the k-th
eigenvalue of L in the following forms:
λk
2
≤ φ(k) ≤ O(k2)
√
λk, (42)
λk
2
≤ φ(k) ≤ O(
√
λ2k · log k). (43)
In this section, we investigate the eigenvalues of the Laplacian of the graphs with optimum two-dimensional
structure entropy, i.e.,H2(G) = O(log2 log2 n).
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8.1 Characterization of the graphs with small two-dimensional structure entropy
Theorem 8.1. (Combinatorial property theorem of the graphswith two-dimensional structure entropyO(log2 log2 n))
Let G = (V,E) be a graph with number of edgesm = |E|, volume vol(G) and no isolated vertices. Let w : E →
R
+ be the weight function satisfying
maxe∈G{w(e)}
mine∈G{w(e)}
≤ W , for some constantW ≥ 1. If H2(G) ≤ c log2 log2m
for some constant c > 0 and any sufficiently largem, then for any ε > 0, and sufficiently largem, there is a set of
modules of vertices, denoted by A, satisfying
(1) vol(A) ≥ (1− 2ε) · vol(G);
(2) For each moduleX ∈ A, Φ(X) ≤ 1/ log1−ε2 m;
(3) For each moduleX ∈ A, |X | ≤ log3c/εm.
Theorem 8.1 implies that if H2(G) = O(log logm), then almost all vertices belong to a module of conduc-
tance ε and size logO(1/ε)m.
Proof. Since the one- and two-dimensional structural entropies depend on the relative weights on edges instead of
the absolute values of the weights, for notational simplicity in our proof, we assume that the least weight on edge
is 1 while the largest one is W . We also assume that there is no isolated vertices in G since isolated vertices do
not change any parameters in the theorem.
Let P be a partition of vertices in G such thatHP(G) ≤ c log2 log2m. Define
J = {j : Vj ∈ P , Hj ≤ ε
−1 · c log2 log2m},
and J = [|P|] \ J , where Vj is the j-th module of P and
Hj = −
∑
v∈Vj
dv
vol(Vj)
log2
dv
vol(Vj)
is the one-dimensional structure entropy of Vj . Since∑
j∈[|P|]
vol(Vj)
vol(G)
·Hj ≤ H
P(G) ≤ c log2 log2m,
we have ∑
j∈J
vol(Vj)
vol(G)
· ε−1c log2 log2m ≤
∑
j∈J
vol(Vj)
vol(G)
·Hj ≤ c log2 log2m.
So ∑
j∈J
vol(Vj)
vol(G)
≤ ε,
and ∑
j∈J
vol(Vj)
vol(G)
≥ 1− ε,
which means that the total volume of the modules in Vj for j ∈ J , denoted by vol(J), is negligible.
Define
J ′ = {j : Vj ∈ P ,Φj ≤
1
log1−ε2 m
},
and J ′ = [|P|] \ J ′. Then we will show that the total volume of the modules in Vj for j ∈ J ′, denoted by vol(J ′),
is also negligible. To this end, the following lemma will be useful.
Lemma 8.1. LetX be a subset of vertices in G with one-dimensional structure entropyH1(X) and conductance
Φ(X). Let mX be the number of edges whose two end-points are both in X . If W ≤ mǫX for some ǫ ≥ 0, then
we have
H1(X) ≥
1− Φ(X)
2
· [(1 − ǫ) log2mX − 3].
23
Proof. We call the edges whose two end-points are both in X to be local edges, and the edges in the cut (X,X),
each of which has exactly one end-point inX , to be global edges. Let
gX =
∑
e∈(X,X)
w(e)
be the total weight of global edges. So gX = Φ(X) · vol(X). Let GX be the subgraph induced by the vertices in
X . So vol(GX) = vol(X)− gX and the number of edges inGX ismX . SinceW ≤ mǫX , by Theorem 21 in [19],
the one-dimensional structure entropy of GX satisfies
H1(GX) ≥
1
2
[(1− ǫ) log2mX − 1].
For each vertex v ∈ X , let gv be the total weight of global edges associated with v. Let vi (1 ≤ i ≤ |X |) be
the i-th vertex in X . Suppose that v1 is the vertex with the largest weighted degree in X (break ties arbitrarily).
Define the weighted degree distribution
X ′ =
{
dv0 +
∑|X|
i=2 gvi
vol(X)
,
dv2 − gv2
vol(X)
, . . . ,
dv|X| − gv|X|
vol(X)
}
,
which is the degree distribution obtained by associating all the global edges to the vertex v1. To establish the
relationship amongH1(X),H(X ′) andH1(GX), we introduce the following property for Shannon entropy.
Lemma 8.2. Let l ≥ 2 be an integer and p = {p1, p2, . . . , pl} be a probability distribution satisfying
∑l
i=1 pi =
1. Suppose that p1 ≥ p2. Then for any 0 ≤ α ≤ p2, let p′ = {p1 + α, p2 − α, p3, . . . , pl}, and we have
H(p) ≥ H(p′).
Proof. Let function
f(α) = H(p)−H(p′)
= (p1 + α) log2(p1 + α) + (p2 − α) log2(p2 − α)− p1 log2 p1 − p2 log2 p2.
So its first derivative
f ′(α) = log2
p1 + α
p2 − α
≥ 0,
for 0 ≤ α ≤ p2. Since f(0) = 0, f(α) ≥ 0 for 0 ≤ α ≤ p2. Lemma 8.2 follows.
Because of the symmetry of function H(·), Lemma 8.2 holds not only for p1 and p2, but for any pi and pj .
By the construction of the distribution X ′, which can be viewed as associating one by one the global edges on vi
for 2 ≤ i ≤ |X | to v1, in which at each step, by Lemma 8.2, the entropy of the intermediate degree distribution is
decreasing. Thus,H1(X) ≥ H(X ′).
On the other hand, letting d′v1 = dv1 +
∑|X|
i=2 gvi and d
′
vi = dvi − gvi for 2 ≤ i ≤ |X |, by the additivity of
H(·), we know that
H(X ′) = H
(
d′v1
vol(X)
,
d′v2
vol(X)
, . . . ,
d′v|X|
vol(X)
)
= H
(
d′v1
vol(X)
,
vol(X)− d′v1
vol(X)
)
+
vol(X)− d′v1
vol(X)
·
|X|∑
i=2
(
d′vi
vol(X)− d′v1
log2
d′vi
vol(X)− d′v1
)
,
and
H1(GX) = H
(
d′v1 − gX
vol(X)− gX
,
d′v2
vol(X)− gX
, . . . ,
d′v|X|
vol(X)− gX
)
= H
(
d′v1 − gX
vol(X)− gX
,
vol(X)− d′v1
vol(X)− gX
)
+
vol(X)− d′v1
vol(X)− gX
·
|X|∑
i=2
(
d′vi
vol(X)− d′v1
log2
d′vi
vol(X)− d′v1
)
.
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Comparing this two equations, we have that
vol(X) ·
[
H(X ′)−H
(
d′v1
vol(X)
,
vol(X)− d′v1
vol(X)
)]
=(vol(X)− gX) ·
[
H1(GX)−H
(
d′v1 − gX
vol(X)− gX
,
vol(X)− d′v1
vol(X)− gX
)]
,
Recall that
H1(GX) ≥
1
2
[(1− ǫ) log2mX − 1],
and Φ(X) = gX/vol(X), we have that
H(X ′) ≥
1− Φ(X)
2
· [(1− ǫ) log2mX − 3].
Recall thatH1(X) ≥ H(X ′). Lemma 8.1 follows.
Then we show that vol(J ′) is negligible. Assume that there is a constant ε0 > 0 such that vol(J ′) ≥ ε0 ·
vol(G). Then the total volume of the modules in Vj for j ∈ J ′, denoted by vol(J ′), is at most (1 − ε0) · vol(G)
Since all the modules Vj for j ∈ J ′ have a conductance at most 1/ log
1−ε
2 m, then the conductance of the union
of all the modules Vj for j ∈ J ′ is also at most 1/ log
1−εm because some global edges for the modules are
possible to be local edges in the union. So the total weight of edges in the cut (∪j∈J′Vj ,∪j∈J′Vj), denoted by
gJ′ , is at most vol(J
′)/ log1−ε2 m, which means that the conductance of ∪j∈J′Vj , denoted by Φ(J
′), is at most
vol(J ′)/(vol(J ′) · log1−ε2 m) ≤ (1− ε0)/(ε0 · log
1−ε
2 m). LetmJ′ be the number of edges whose two end-points
are both in ∪j∈J′Vj . Recall that for each edge e, 1 ≤ w(e) ≤W . Then
mJ′ ≥
vol(J ′)− gJ′
W
=
(1− Φ(J ′)) · vol(J ′)
W
≥
ε0 ·m
W
·
(
1−
1− ε0
ε0 · log
1−ε
2 m
)
.
Since W ≤ mǫ
J′
for sufficiently large m, by Lemma 8.1, the one-dimensional structure entropy of ∪j∈J′Vj
satisfies
H1(J ′) ≥
1− Φ(J ′)
2
· [(1− ǫ) log2mJ′ − 3] = Ω(logm).
By the additivity of entropy function, we have that
H1(J ′) =
∑
j∈J′
vol(Vj)
vol(J ′)
·Hj +
∑
j∈J′
(
vol(Vj)
vol(J ′)
· log2
vol(Vj)
vol(J ′)
)
= Ω(logm).
Since vol(J ′) ≥ ε0 · vol(G), we know that∑
j∈J′
vol(Vj)
vol(G)
·Hj +
∑
j∈J′
vol(Vj)
vol(G)
log2
vol(Vj)
vol(G)
= Ω(logm).
Note that Φj > 1/ log
1−ε
2 m. Thus,
HP(G) =
∑
j∈J′
vol(Vj)
vol(G)
·Hj +
∑
j∈J′
Φj ·
vol(Vj)
vol(G)
log2
vol(Vj)
vol(G)
+
∑
j∈J′
vol(Vj)
vol(G)
·Hj +
∑
j∈J′
Φj ·
vol(Vj)
vol(G)
log2
vol(Vj)
vol(G)
= Ω(logε2m),
which contradicts the fact that HP(G) ≤ c log2 log2m for some constant c > 0 and sufficiently largem. There-
fore, for any ε > 0, vol(J ′) ≤ ε · vol(G) is negligible.
Now, define A = J ∩ J ′ to indicate the set of modules both in J and J ′. So for any j ∈ A, Hj ≤ ε−1 ·
c log2 log2m and Φj ≤ 1/ log
1−ε
2 m. The total volume of modules in A is at least vol(G) − vol(J) − vol(J
′) ≥
(1− 2ε) · vol(G). So we only have to show that the size of each module Vj in A has a size at most log
3c/εm, and
then Theorem 8.1 follows.
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By Lemma 8.1, for each j ∈ A,
Hj ≥
1− Φj
2
· [(1− ǫ) log2mj − 3],
ifW ≤ mǫj , wheremj is the number of edges whose two end-points are both in Vj . This condition holds for any
mj = ω(1) and in this case, ǫ can be arbitrarily close to 0. Otherwise, mj = O(1) and we have already shown
that the size of Vj is at most log
3c/εm for sufficiently largem since there is no isolated vertex in G.
SinceHj ≤ ε−1 · c log2 log2m, we have that
ε−1 · c log2 log2m ≥
1− Φj
2
· [(1 − ǫ) log2mj − 3].
Since Φj ≤ 1/ log
1−ε
2 m, we have that
(1− ǫ) log2mj ≤
2c log2 log2m
ε · (1− 1/ log1−ε2 m)
+ 3.
Thus, for sufficiently largem, both the number of edges and the number of vertices in Vj is at most log
3c/εm.
This completes the proof of Theorem 8.1.
By appropriately choosing the parameters in the proof of Theorem 8.1, we have the following:
Theorem 8.2. LetG = (V,E) be a graph with number of edgesm = |E| and volume vol(G). Letw : E → R+ be
the weight function satisfying
maxe∈G{w(e)}
mine∈G{w(e)}
≤W , for some constantW ≥ 1. If for any c > 0,H2(G) ≤ c log2m
for any sufficiently large m, then for any ε, φ > 0, and sufficiently large m, there is a set of modules of vertices,
denoted by A, satisfying
(1) vol(A) ≥ (1− 2ε) · vol(G);
(2) For each moduleX ∈ A, Φ(X) ≤ φ;
(3) For each moduleX ∈ A, |X | ≤ mε.
Theorem 8.1 shows thatH2(G) = O(log logn) guarantee a nice combinatorial property of the graph. On the
other hand, combinatorial properties ensure thatH2(G) = O(log logn).
Theorem 8.3. (Combinatorial properties guaranteeH2(G) = O(log logn)) Let G = (V,E) be a connected and
balanced graph of size n = |V |. Then both (1) and (2) below hold:
(1) If there is a set of modules A satisfying
(i) vol(A) = (1− o(1)) · vol(G), where vol(A) is the sum of the weighted degrees of all the nodes in the
modules in A;
(ii) For each moduleX ∈ A, its size |X | = no(1);
(iii) For each moduleX ∈ A, its conductanceΦ(X) = o(1),
then the two-dimensional structural information of G isH2(G) = o(logn).
(2) If there is a set of modules A satisfying
(i) vol(A) =
(
1−O
(
log logn
log n
))
· vol(G);
(ii) For each moduleX ∈ A, |X | = logO(1) n;
(iii) For each moduleX ∈ A, Φ(X) = O
(
log log n
logn
)
,
thenH2(G) = O(log logn).
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Proof. Consider the partition of nodes of G that consists of the modules in A and the module, denoted by S,
composed by the nodes not in A. Note that
H2(G) ≤
∑
X∈A
vol(X)
vol(G)
· H1(X) +
∑
X∈A
Φ(X) ·
vol(X)
vol(G)
log2
vol(X)
vol(G)
+
vol(S)
vol(G)
· H1(S) + Φ(S) ·
vol(S)
vol(G)
log2
vol(S)
vol(G)
.
For (1), for eachX ∈ A, we have
(i) H1(X) ≤ log2 |X | = o(logn),
(ii) Φ(X) = o(1),
(iii)
∑
X∈A(vol(X)/vol(G)) log2(vol(X)/vol(G)) ≤ log2 n,
(iv) vol(S) = o(1) · vol(G), H1(S) ≤ log2 n, and
(v) Φ(S) · (vol(S)/vol(G)) log2(vol(S)/vol(G)) ≤ 1.
So in all,H2(G) = o(log n).
For (2), for eachX ∈ A, we have:
(i) H1(X) ≤ log2 |X | = O(log logn),
(ii) Φ(X) = O(log logn/ logn),
(iii)
∑
X∈A(vol(X)/vol(G)) log2(vol(X)/vol(G)) ≤ log2 n,
(iv) vol(S) = O(log logn/ logn) · vol(G),
(v) H1(S) ≤ log2 n, and
(vi) Φ(S) · (vol(S)/vol(G)) log2(vol(S)/vol(G)) ≤ 1.
So we haveH2(G) = O(log logn).
Theorems 8.1 and 8.3 together give a combinatorial characterization for the graphsGwithH2(G) = O(log logn).
However, in this characterization, the combinatorial property is complicated. This is the disadvantage of the com-
binatorial characterization theorem. We then look for simpler characterizations of the graphs.
8.2 Algebraic properties of the graphs withH2(G) = O(log logn)
In this part, we show that for any connected graphG, if the two-dimensional structure entropyH2(G) = O(log logn),
then there are many eigenvalues of the Laplacian of G that are close to 0. The proof of the result is actually an
application of Theorem 8.1.
Theorem 8.4. (Algebraic characterization theorem of the graphswith two-dimensional structure entropyO(log2 log2 n))
For every weighted graphG = (V,E,w) with number of edgesm = |E| and weight function w : E → R+ satis-
fying
maxe∈G{w(e)}
mine∈G{w(e)}
≤ W for some constantW ≥ 1, if H2(G) ≤ c log2 log2m for some constant c > 0 and any
sufficiently largem, then for any ε > 0 and sufficiently largem, there is an integer
k ≥
(1 − 2ε) ·m
W · log
6c/ε
2 m
such that λk ≤ 2/ log
1−ε
2 m.
Theorem 8.4 implies that if H2(G) = O(log logm), then there is an integer k = Ω(n/poly logm) such that
the k-th largest eigenvalue λk of the Laplacian of G satisfies λk = o(1).
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Proof. By Theorem 8.1, we know that there is a subset of vertices A ⊆ V satisfying the three properties stated
in Theorem 8.1. Assume again that the least weight on edge is 1 while the largest one is W . For each module
X ∈ A, denote by gX the total weight of global edges ofX . Then we have
Φ(X) =
gX
vol(X)
≤
1
log1−ε2 m
.
Moreover, since |X | ≤ log
3c/ε
2 m, we have
vol(X)− gX ≤W · log
6c/ε
2 m.
Combining the two inequalities above, we have
vol(X) ≤
W · log
6c/ε
2 m
1− log
−(1−ε)
2 m
.
Since vol(A) ≥ (1− 2ε) · vol(G) and vol(G) ≥ 2m, the total number of modules in A is at least
(1 − 2ε) · 2m
W ·log
6c/ε
2 m
1−log
−(1−ε)
2 m
≥
(1− 2ε) ·m
W · log
6c/ε
2 m
, k0
for sufficiently large m. This means that we can find at least k0 disjoint modules in G, each of which has con-
ductance at most 1/ log1−ε2 m. By the high-order Cheeger’s inequalities, there is an integer k ≥ k0 such that the
k-way conductance of G is at most 1/ log1−ε2 m, and so λk ≤ 2/ log
1−ε
2 m. The theorem follows.
For any connected and balanced graph G, if H2(G) = O(log logn), then the security index θ(G) of G is
1−o(1). By Theorem 8.4, in this case, there is a large k such that the k-th largest eigenvalue λk of the Laplacian of
G is less than a small constant ǫ > 0. In the next section, we will show that this result can be further strengthened.
It is interesting to notice that each eigenvalue is in [0, 2], and that the summation of all the eigenvalues λi is n,
provided that there is no isolated vertex in the graph. Theorem 8.4 implies that the distribution of the eigenvalues
of the Laplacian of a graph is closely related to the security of the graph, leading to an interesting open question to
investigate the relationship between the distribution of the eigenvalues of the Laplacian of a graph and the security
of the graph.
9 Eigenvalues of the Laplacian of the Security Graphs
For a given resistor graph, we first establish the following combinatorial characterization theorem.
Theorem 9.1. (Combinatorial property theorem of resistor graphs) Let G = (V,E) be a graph with number of
edgesm = |E| and volume vol(G). Let w : E → R+ be the weight function satisfying maxe∈G{w(e)}mine∈G{w(e)} ≤ W , for
some constantW ≥ 1. If the security index θ(G) ≥ 1− θ for some constant θ, then for any ε > 0, φ > θ, there is
a constant α < 1 (related to θ and φ), such that for any sufficiently largem, there is a set of modules of vertices,
denoted by A, satisfying
(1) vol(A) ≥ (1− α− ε) · vol(G);
(2) For each moduleX ∈ A, Φ(X) ≤ φ;
(3) For each moduleX ∈ A, |X | ≤ 2H
1(G)· 3θ
ε(1−φ)(1−ǫ) .
Proof. We also suppose that the edge weights range from 1 toW . Since θ(G) ≥ 1 − θ, there is a partition P on
V such thatHP(G) ≤ θ · H1(G). Define
J = {j : Vj ∈ P , Hj ≤ ε
−1 · θH1(G)},
where Vj is the j-th module of P and
Hj = −
∑
v∈Vj
dv
vol(Vj)
log2
dv
vol(Vj)
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is the one-dimensional structure entropy of Vj . Thus the fraction of total volume of J satisfies∑
j∈J
vol(Vj)
vol(G)
≤ ε.
Define
J ′ = {j : Vj ∈ P ,Φj ≤ φ},
and J ′ = [|P|] \ J ′. Then we will show that the fraction of the total volume of the modules in Vj for j ∈ J ′,
denoted by vol(J ′), is at most some constant α. Let vol(J ′) = ε0 · vol(G). ThenHP(G) ≤ θ · H1(G) means that
(1− θ) ·
∑
j∈[|P|]
vol(Vj)
vol(G)
·Hj ≤ (θ − Φj) · Hˆ(J
′) + (θ − Φj) · Hˆ(J ′),
where
Hˆ(J ′) = −
∑
j∈J′
vol(Vj)
vol(G)
log2
vol(Vj)
vol(G)
and
Hˆ(J ′) = −
∑
j∈J′
vol(Vj)
vol(G)
log2
vol(Vj)
vol(G)
.
By the definition of J ′, we have
(1 − θ) ·
∑
j∈[|P|]
vol(Vj)
vol(G)
·Hj ≤ θ · Hˆ(J
′) + (θ − φ) · Hˆ(J ′).
Replacing vol(J ′) and vol(J ′) with ε0 · vol(G) and (1− ε0) · vol(G), respectively, we get
(1−θ) ·
∑
j∈[|P|]
vol(Vj)
vol(G)
·Hj ≤ θ(1−ε0) ·H(J
′)+(θ−φ)ε0 ·H(J ′)−θ(1−ε0) log2(1−ε0)− (θ−φ)ε0 log2 ε0,
where
H(J ′) = −
∑
j∈J′
vol(Vj)
vol(J ′)
log2
vol(Vj)
vol(J ′)
and
H(J ′) = −
∑
j∈J′
vol(Vj)
vol(J ′)
log2
vol(Vj)
vol(J ′)
.
This implies that
(1− θ) ·
∑
j∈[|P|]
vol(Vj)
vol(G)
·Hj ≤ θ ·H(J
′)− [θ ·H(J ′) + (φ− θ) ·H(J ′)] · ε0 + 2θ.
Since the left hand side is non-negative, ε0 is not negligible unlessH(J ′) is negligible compared withH(J
′).
In the latter case, ifH(J ′) ≤ ε′ ·H(J ′) for a small enough ε′, by a straightforward calculation, we have
Hˆ(J ′) =
ε′ε0
1− ε0
· Hˆ(J ′) + (1 − ε0) log2(1 − ε0)− ε0 log2 ε0.
So if 1− ε0 = o(1), then both Hˆ(J ′) and Hˆ(J ′) are o(log n), which contradicts to the fact that Hˆ(J ′)+ Hˆ(J ′) ≥
(1− θ) · H1(G). Therefore, there is a constant α < 1 such that ε0 ≤ α.
So defineA = J ∩J ′, and thus for any j ∈ A,Hj ≤ ε−1 · θH1(G) and Φj ≤ φ. The total volume of modules
in A is at least vol(G)− vol(J)− vol(J ′) ≥ (1− ε−α) · vol(G). So the only task is to show that the size of each
such module is at most 2H
1(G)· 3θ
ε(1−φ)(1−ǫ) .
By Lemma 8.1, for each j ∈ A,
ε−1 · θH1(G) ≥ Hj ≥
1− Φj
2
· [(1− ǫ) log2mj − 3].
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Since Φj ≤ φ, we have that
(1− ǫ) log2mj ≤
2θ · H1(G)
ε(1− φ)
+ 3.
Therefore, for sufficiently largem, both the number of edgesmj and the number of vertices in Vj is upper bounded
by 2H
1(G)· 3θ
ε(1−φ)(1−ǫ) . This completes the proof of Theorem 9.1.
By Theorem 9.1, we have the following algebraic property theorem of the general resistor graphs.
Theorem 9.2. (Algebraic property theorem of resistor graphs) For every weighted graph G = (V,E,w) with
number of edges m = |E| and weight function w : E → R+ satisfying maxe∈G{w(e)}mine∈G{w(e)} ≤ W for some constant
W ≥ 1, if the security index θ(G) ≥ 1 − θ for some constant θ, then for any ε > 0, φ > θ, there is a constant
α < 1 such that for any sufficiently largem, there is an integer
k ≥
2(1− α− ε)(1− φ) ·m
W · 2H
1(G)· 6θε(1−φ)(1−ǫ)
such that λk ≤ 2φ.
Proof. By the proof of Theorem 8.4.
10 Conclusions and Discussion
We proposed the notion of resistance of a graph to measure the force of the graph to resist cascading failures
of strategic virus attacks. The resistance of a graph G is the maximum number of bits required to determine
the codeword of the module of the graph that is accessible from random walk from which random walk cannot
escape. We found the resistance law of networks that the resistance of a graph is the difference of the one- and
two-dimensional structure entropy of the graph. Here, for a graphG and a natural numberK , theK-dimensional
structure entropy ofG is the least number of bits required to determine theK-dimensional codeword of the vertex
that is accessible from the randomwalk with stationary distribution inG. We defined the security index of a graph
G to be the normalised resistance of G. We propose the notion of (n, θ)-resistor graph. For a large constant θ
(that is, less than and close to 1), an (n, θ)-resistor graph is a connected graph with n vertices, and with security
index greater than or equal to θ. We showed that for a tree with bounded weights or grid graphs G, the resistance
of G is Ω(log n) and the security index of G is 1 − o(1). The results demonstrate that the natural structures such
as trees and grid graphs have the important property of high resistance and high security against virus attacks. We
showed that for the networksG of the security model with affinity exponent a > 0 and edge parameter d ≥ 2, the
resistance of G is maximised as Ω(logn), and the security index of G is maximised as 1 − o(1), for sufficiently
large n. Therefore, the security model does generate the networks of high resistances and high security indices. We
also establish both a combinatorial and an algebraic characterization theorems of the resistor graphs. In particular,
we show that for a large constant θ, for an (n, θ)-resistor graph, and for any small constant ǫ > 0, there is a
large k such that the k-th largest eigenvalue of the Laplacian of the graph is less than ǫ. Our results provide the
fundamental theory for network security, with potential applications in the security engineering of networks.
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Appendix A: Probabilistic Tools
We will use the following form of Chernoff bound.
Lemma 10.1. (Chernoff bound, [6]) Let X1, . . . , Xn be independent random variables with Pr[Xi = 1] = pi
and Pr[Xi = 0] = 1− pi. Denote the sum byX =
n∑
i=1
Xi with expectation E(X) =
n∑
i=1
pi. Then we have
Pr[X ≤ E(X)− λ] ≤ exp
(
−
λ2
2E(X)
)
,
Pr[X ≥ E(X) + λ] ≤ exp
(
−
λ2
2(E(X) + λ/3)
)
.
We will use the following form of Azuma’s inequality for martingales.
Lemma 10.2. (Azuma’s inequality) Let c = (c1, . . . , cn) be a vector of positive entries. Let a sequence of random
variablesX0, X1, . . . , Xn be a martingale. If it is c-Lipschitz, that is, |Xi−Xi−1| ≤ ci for i = 1, . . . , n, then for
any λ > 0,
Pr[Xn ≤ X0 − λ] ≤ exp
(
−
λ2
2
∑n
i=1 c
2
i
)
,
Pr[Xn ≥ X0 + λ] ≤ exp
(
−
λ2
2
∑n
i=1 c
2
i
)
.
We will use the following form of supermartingale inequality.
Lemma 10.3. (Supermartingale inequality, [7] Theorem 2.40) For a filter {0,Ω} = F0 ⊂ F1 ⊂ · · · ⊂ Fn = F ,
suppose that a non-negative random variableXi is Fi-measurable for 0 ≤ i ≤ n. Let B be the bad set associated
with the following admissible conditions: (that is, the set of events that the conditions fail to hold.)
E(Xi|Fi−1) ≤ Xi−1,
Var(Xi|Fi−1) ≤ σ
2
i + φiXi−1,
Xi − E(Xi|Fi−1) ≤ ai +M,
where σi, φi, ai andM are non-negative constants. Then we have
Pr(Xn ≥ X0 + λ) ≤ exp
(
−
λ2
2(
∑n
i=1(σ
2
i + a
2
i ) + (X0 + λ)(
∑n
i=1 φi) +Mλ/3)
)
+ Pr(B).
The following fact will also be very useful in our proofs.
Fact 10.1. For any real x,
1
x+ 1
≤ log
(
1 +
1
x
)
≤
1
x
.
Proof. Note that 1+y ≤ ey holds for all real y. The fact is obtained by replacing y with− 1x+1 and
1
x , respectively.
The following expansion of power series is folklore.
Fact 10.2. For any u > 0 and |x| ≤ 1,
(1± x)u = 1± ux+
u(u− 1)
2!
x2 ±
u(u− 1)(u − 2)
3!
x3
+ · · ·+ (−1)m
u(u− 1) · · · (u−m+ 1)
m!
xm + · · · .
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Appendix B: Proof of Theorem 7.2
Proof. (Proof of Theorem 7.2) For (1). By the construction of G, the expectation of |Ct| is
E[|Ct|] = n0 +
t∑
i=3
1
loga i
.
By indefinite integral ∫
(
1
loga x
−
a
loga+1 x
)dx =
x
loga x
+ C,
we know that if t ≥ T1 is large enough (when n is large enough), then
t∑
i=3
1
loga i
≤ 1 +
∫ t
2
1
loga x
dx
≤
∫ t
2
6
5
(
1
loga x
−
a
loga+1 x
)dx
≤
4t
3 loga t
,
where 65 and
4
3 are chosen arbitrarily among the numbers larger than 1. Similarly,
t∑
i=3
1
loga i
≥
∫ t
2
1
loga x
dx
≥
∫ t
2
(
1
loga x
−
a
loga+1 x
)dx
≥
3t
4 loga t
.
By the Chernoff bound (Lemma 10.1), since t ≥ T1 and n0 is a constant, with probability 1−exp(−Ω(
t
loga t )) =
1 − o(n−1), we have t2 loga t ≤ |Ct| ≤
2t
loga t . By the union bound, such an inequality holds for all t ≥ T1 with
probability 1− o(1).
we define the following event:
Definition 10.1. Let E be the event that, for all i ≥ T1,
i
2 loga i ≤ |Ci| ≤
2i
loga i .
By the discussion above, E happens with probability 1 − o(1). We will assume and use this event frequently
throughout our proofs.
For (2). By the construction of G, the expectation of |S| at time step t is
E(|S|) = 1 +
t∑
i=tS+1
(
1−
1
loga i
)
·
1
|Ci|
.
By (1), we know that E holds with probability 1− o(1). Thus, if a > 0, then at time step t,
E(|S|) = Θ
(
t∑
i=tS
(
1−
1
loga t
)
·
loga t
t
)
= Θ
(∫ t
tS
loga x
x
dx
)
= Θ(loga+1 t− loga+1 tS).
For (3). It suffices to show that with probability 1 − o(n−1), the homochromatic set of the first color κ has
size 4 loga+1 n. Then the result follows from the union bound.
Let Sκ be the set of vertices sharing color κ. Conditioned on the event E , for large enough n,
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E(|Sκ|) = 1 +
n∑
i=3
(
1−
1
loga i
)
·
1
|Ci|
≤ T1 +
n∑
i=T1+1
(
1−
1
loga i
)
·
2 loga i
i
≤ 3 loga+1 n.
By the Chernoff bound,
Pr[|Sκ| > 4 log
a+1 n] = o(n−1).
Therefore, with probability 1− o(n−1), the size of Sκ is at most 4 log
a+1 n.
For (4). We need to bound the number of global edges with one endpoint in S.
For t ≥ tS , define S[t] to be the snapshot of S at time step t, and ∂(S)[t] to be the set of edges from S[t] to
S[t], the complement of S[t]. So ∂(S)[t] is in fact the set of global edges of S at time step t and gS = |∂(S)[n]|.
Denote by D(S)[t] the total degree of vertices in (the volume of) S[t]. In our proof, we first give a recurrence for
the expected value ofD(S)[t] at any time step t > tS , and then show that ∂(S)[n] is not expectedly too many.
By the construction ofG, when a new vertex is created, the volume it contributes to the network is 2d. By (1),
we know that the volume of Gt is 2d(1 + o(1))t, where o(t) is contributed by Gn0 . The recurrence of D(S)[t]
satisfies
E[D(S)[t] | D(S)[t− 1]] ≤ D(S)[t− 1] +
1
loga t
[
D(S)[t− 1]
2d(t− 1)
+ (d− 1) ·
1
|Ct−1|
]
+
(
1−
1
loga t
)
·
2d
|Ct−1|
. (44)
We suppose the event E that for all t ≥ T1 = log
a+1 n, t2 loga t ≤ |Ct| ≤
2t
loga t , which almost surely holds by
(1). It also holds for t ≥ T2 for sufficiently large n. On this condition, recalling that d ≥ 2, we have
E[D(S)[t] | D(S)[t− 1]] ≤ D(S)[t− 1]
[
1 +
1
2(t− 1) loga t
]
+
4d loga t
t
. (45)
Taking expectation on both sides, we have
E(D(S)[t]) ≤ E(D(S)[t− 1])
[
1 +
1
2(t− 1) loga t
]
+
4d loga t
t
. (46)
Then we analyze this recurrence for the cases of a ≥ 1 and a < 1, respectively.
When a ≥ 1, since for sufficiently large n and thus for sufficiently large t with t ≥ tS ≥ T2, we have
9d loga+1(t+ 1)−
[
1 +
1
2(t− 1) loga t
]
· 9d loga+1 t
≥ 9d loga t log
t+ 1
t
−
9d log t
2(t− 1)
≥
9d loga t
t+ 1
−
9d loga t
2(t− 1)
≥
4d loga t
t
, (47)
where the second inequality follows from Fact 10.1. Applying it to Inequality (46), we have
E(D(S)[t]) − 9d loga+1(t+ 1) ≤
[
1 +
1
2(t− 1) loga t
]
· (E(D(S)[t − 1])− 9d loga+1 t).
Recursively, we have
E(D(S)[t]) ≤ θt · [E(D(S)[tS ])− 9d log
a+1(tS + 1)] + 9d log
a+1(t+ 1)
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holds for all tS < t ≤ n, where
θt =
t∏
i=tS+1
[
1 +
1
2(i− 1) loga i
]
.
Note that E(D(S)[tS ]) = d. So
E(D(S)[t]) ≤ 9d loga+1(t+ 1)− θt · [9d log
a+1(tS + 1)− d]. (48)
When 0 < a < 1, since for sufficiently large n and thus for sufficiently large t,[
1 +
1
2(t− 1) loga t
]
· 9d log2a t− 9d log2a(t+ 1)
=
9d loga t
2(t− 1)
− 9d · [log2a(t+ 1)− log2a t]
≥
9d loga t
2(t− 1)
−
d loga t
2t
≥
4d loga t
t
, (49)
where the first inequality follows from the fact that log(t+ 1)− log t = log
(
1 + 1t
)
≤ 1t and so when a < 1,
lim
t→∞
log2a(t+ 1)− log2a t
loga t
t
= lim
t→∞
t ·
[
loga(t+ 1)
loga t
− 1
]
· (loga(t+ 1) + loga t)
≤ lim
t→∞
t ·
[
log(t+ 1)
log t
− 1
]
· (loga(t+ 1) + loga t)
≤ lim
t→∞
t ·
log(t+ 1)− log t
log t
· 2 loga(t+ 1)
≤ lim
t→∞
2 loga(t+ 1)
log t
= 0.
Applying Inequality (49) to (46), we have
E(D(S)[t]) + 9d log2a(t+ 1) ≤
[
1 +
1
2(t− 1) loga t
]
· (E(D(S)[t − 1]) + 9d log2a t).
Recursively, we have
E(D(S)[t]) ≤ θt · [E(D(S)[tS ]) + 9d log
2a(tS + 1)]− 9d log
2a(t+ 1)
holds for all tS < t ≤ n, and so
E(D(S)[t]) ≤ θt · [9d log
2a(tS + 1) + d]− 9d log
2a(t+ 1). (50)
Note that by the construction of G,
E(gS) ≤
n∑
t=tS
1
loga t
[
E(D(S)[t])
2d(t− 1)
+ E
(
d− 1
|Ct−1|
)]
. (51)
Let
U1 =
n∑
t=tS
E(D(S)[t])
2d(t− 1) loga t
and
U2 =
n∑
t=tS
E
(
d− 1
|Ct−1| · log
a t
)
.
So E(gS) ≤ U1 + U2. Recall that in the proof of (1), we have shown that for each time step t ≥ T1(≥ T2), with
probability at least 1− exp(−Ω( tloga t )), we have
t
2 loga t ≤ |Ct| ≤
2t
loga t . So for some constant c > 0,
E
(
d− 1
|Ct−1| · log
a t
)
≤
2(d− 1)
t
+ t · exp
(
−
ct
loga t
)
,
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and so
U2 ≤
n∑
t=tS
E
(
d− 1
|Ct−1| · log
a t
)
= O(d · (logn− log tS)) = O(d · log logn).
Next, we will bound U1 by using Inequalities (48) and (50) for different values of a.
When a ≥ 1, we have
U1 ≤
n∑
t=tS
9d loga+1(t+ 1)− θt · [9d log
a+1(tS + 1)− d]
2d(t− 1) loga t
.
Since θt > 1, for sufficient large n, we have
U1 ≤
n∑
t=tS
9 loga+1(t+ 1)− [9 loga+1(tS + 1)− 1]
2(t− 1) loga t
≤
9
2
[
n∑
t=tS
log t
t− 1
− loga+1(tS + 1)
n∑
t=tS
1
(t− 1) loga t
]
≤
9
2
(∫ n
tS
log x
x
dx− loga+1 tS
∫ n
tS
1
x loga x
dx
)
.
If a > 1, then
U1 ≤
9
2
·
[
1
2
(log2 n− log2 tS)−
loga+1 tS
1− a
(log1−a n− log1−a tS))
]
=
9
2
log2 n ·
[
1
2
−
(
1
2
+
1
a− 1
)(
log tS
logn
)2
+
1
a− 1
(
log tS
logn
)a+1]
=
9
2
log2 n ·
[
1
2
−
a+ 1
2(a− 1)
(
1−
b log logn
logn
)2
+
1
a− 1
(
1−
b log logn
logn
)a+1]
.
By Fact 10.2, (
1−
b log logn
logn
)a+1
≤ 1−
(a+ 1)b log logn
logn
+
(a+ 1)ab2(log logn)2
2 log2 n
.
Thus,
U1 ≤
9
2
log2 n ·
[
1
2
−
a+ 1
2(a− 1)
(
1−
2b log logn
logn
+
b2(log logn)2
log2 n
)
+
1
a− 1
(
1−
(a+ 1)b log logn
logn
+
(a+ 1)ab2(log logn)2
2 log2 n
)]
=
9
4
(a+ 1)b2(log logn)2.
Note that E(gS) = U1 + U2 and U2 = O(log logn). For sufficiently large n, E(gS) ≤
5
2 (a + 1)b
2(log log n)2.
(4)(i) follows.
If a = 1, then
U1 ≤
9
2
·
(∫ n
tS
log x
x
dx− log2 tS
∫ n
tS
1
x log x
dx
)
=
9
2
[
1
2
(log2 n− log2 tS)− log
2 tS · (log logn− log log tS)
]
=
9
2
[
1
2
(log2 n− log2 tS)− log
2 tS · log
(
1 +
b log logn
logn− b log logn
)]
≤
9
2
[
1
2
(log2 n− log2 tS)− log
2 tS ·
b log log n
logn
]
=
9
2
[
1
2
log2 n−
1
2
(log n− b log logn)2 − (logn− b log logn)2 ·
b log logn
logn
]
=
9
2
[
3
2
b2(log logn)2 −
(b log log n)3
logn
]
≤
27
4
b2(log logn)2.
36
Since E(gS) = U1 + U2 and U2 = O(log logn), when n is large enough, E(gS) ≤ 8b2(log logn)2. (4)(ii)
follows.
When a < 1, applying Inequality (50) to (51), we have
U1 ≤
n∑
t=tS
θt · (9d log
2a(tS + 1) + d)− 9d log
2a(t+ 1)
2d(t− 1) loga t
≤
9
2
·
[
n∑
t=tS
θn log
2a tS
(t− 1) loga t
−
n∑
t=tS
log2a(t+ 1)
(t− 1) loga t
]
=
9
2
·
(
θn log
2a tS ·
∫ n
tS
1
x loga x
dx−
∫ n
tS
logax
x
dx
)
+O
(
1
n
)
=
9
2
·
(
θn log
2a tS ·
log1−a n− log1−a tS
1− a
−
log1+a n− log1+a tS
1 + a
)
+ O
(
1
n
)
=
9θn
2(1− a)
log1−a n log2a tS −
9
2
(
θn
1− a
−
1
1 + a
)
log1+a tS
−
9
2(1 + a)
log1+a n+O
(
1
n
)
=
9θn
2(1− a)
log1+a n
(
1−
b log logn
logn
)2a
−
9
2
(
θn
1− a
−
1
1 + a
)
log1+a n
·
(
1−
b log log n
logn
)1+a
−
9
2(1 + a)
log1+a n+O
(
1
n
)
=
9θn
2(1− a)
log1+a n ·
[
1−
2ab log logn
logn
+
2a(2a− 1)
2
(
b log logn
logn
)2
+O
(
log logn
logn
)3]
−
9
2
(
θn
1− a
−
1
1 + a
)
log1+a n ·
[
1−
(1 + a)b log log n
log n
+
(a+ 1)a
2
(
b log logn
logn
)2
+O
(
log logn
logn
)3]
−
9
2(1 + a)
loga+1 n+O
(
1
n
)
=
[
9θn
2(1− a)
−
9
2
(
θn
1− a
−
1
1 + a
)
−
9
2(1 + a)
]
· log1+a n+
[
−
9
2(1− a)
· 2ab
+
9
2
(
θn
1− a
−
1
1 + a
)
· (1 + a)b
]
· loga n log logn+O
[
(log logn)2
log1−a n
]
=
9
2
b(θn − 1) log
a n log logn+O
[
(log logn)2
log1−a n
]
.
To deal with the factor (θn − 1), we need the following lemma.
Lemma 10.4. For sufficiently large n,
θn − 1 ≤
b log logn
loga n
.
Note that by the above lemma, for sufficiently large n
U1 ≤
9
2
b ·
b log log n
loga n
loga n log logn+O
[
(log logn)2
log1−a n
]
≤
9
2
b2(log logn)2.
Note that E(gS) = U1 + U2 and U2 = O(log logn). For sufficiently large n, E(gS) ≤ 5b2(log logn)2. (4)(iii)
follows.
To complete the proof, we prove Lemma 10.4.
Proof. Recall that
θn =
n∏
i=tS+1
[
1 +
1
2(i− 1) loga i
]
.
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Then
log θn =
n∑
i=tS+1
log
[
1 +
1
2(i− 1) loga i
]
≤
n∑
i=tS+1
1
2(i− 1) loga i
≤
1
2
∫ n
tS
1
x loga x
=
1
2(1− a)
· (log1−a n− log1−a tS)
=
log1−a n
2(1− a)
·
[
1−
(
1−
b log logn
logn
)1−a]
=
log1−a n
2(1− a)
·
[
(1− a) ·
b log logn
log n
−
(1− a)(−a)
2
·
(
b log logn
logn
)2
+O
(
log logn
logn
)3]
=
b log logn
2 loga n
+O
[
(log logn)2
log1+a n
]
.
Thus, for sufficiently large n, log θn ≤
3b log logn
4 loga n , which implies that
θn ≤ (logn)
3b
4 loga n .
A key observation is that, for any constant c, by l’Hoˆpital’s rule,
lim
n→∞
(logn)
c
loga n − 1
log logn
loga n
= lim
y→∞
y
c
ya − 1
log y
ya
= lim
y→∞
(
y
c
ya − 1
)′
(
log y
ya
)′
= lim
y→∞
c(1− a log y)
y1+a−
c
ya
·
y1+a
1− a log y
= lim
y→∞
c · y
c
ya = lim
y→∞
c · e
c log y
ya = c.
Thus, for any ǫ > 0, if n is large enough, then
θn − 1 ≤
3b
4
(1 + ǫ) ·
log logn
loga n
.
Let ǫ = 13 , then the lemma follows.
This completes the proof of Theorem 7.2.
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